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Abstract 
The 2011 Saskatchewan Election saw a landslide victory for The Saskatchewan Party. They also 
achieved this victory during a time in which the province was experiencing economic revitalization. Past 
studies have suggested that incumbents are rewarded for good economic times. As such, the 2011 
Saskatchewan election provides for a good case study that aims to understand if perceptions of the 
economy influenced Saskatchewan residents vote choice at that time. Using data collected from the 
2011 Saskatchewan Election Study, this thesis has found that retrospective sociotropic and egocentric 
perceptions of the economy did have a small direct role in influencing vote choice during the election. 
However, this thesis also found that once leadership opinions of Brad Wall were added to the statistical 
analysis these perceptions became insignificant. Interestingly, the same economic perceptions were 
found to make up a part of Wall’s leadership evaluation.  With leadership evaluations being the largest 
determinant of vote choice, this thesis found that economic perceptions did play a role in the 2011 
Saskatchewan Election, albeit in a roundabout way.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The province of Saskatchewan has experienced economic revitalization in recent years. 
With high commodity prices (Grey, 2009) and an unemployment level lower than the national 
average in 2011 (Saskatchewan 2011; Statistics Canada, 2011), the province is booming, and 
the future appears bright as economic forecasts predict an increase in the natural resource 
service industry to support rising natural resource development (Abma, 2011). Saskatchewan’s 
robust economy is particularly notable when contrasted with the broader national and global 
economic situation: many other jurisdictions have faced economic challenges in recent years, 
and since the 2008 economic crisis, the global economic climate has been slow to recover.  
In spite of the slow global and national recovery, Saskatchewan’s economy has 
continued to grow (Royal Bank of Canada, 2008; CBC News, 2008). This economic improvement 
has been so robust that, after years of receiving federal equalization payments, Saskatchewan 
became one of the few Canadian provinces that do not receive financial transfer payments 
from the federal government to promote equal levels of public services. The difference 
between a “have” (non-equalization receiving) and a “have not” (equalization receiving) 
province is a concept that carries a lot of influence with Canadians, and Saskatchewan’s 
provincial leaders have been quick to link the province’s new ‘have’ status as an indication of 
economic success and well-being (Spears, 2010). Indeed, the Saskatchewan Party Government 
has been quick to tout the province’s economic success (Wall, 2011a; Global News 2011), and 
the economy seemed to play a large part in the Saskatchewan Party’s victorious 2011 election 
campaign.  
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To what extent does the 2011 Saskatchewan election result reflect the province’s 
economic fortunes? When one considers both the recent economic strength of the province 
and the related government rhetoric, it seems reasonable to assume that, to some degree, 
voters considered their perceptions of the provincial economy when casting their vote. Stated 
differently; Saskatchewan’s current economic climate, particularly when juxtaposed with that 
of the rest of the country, makes Saskatchewan a compelling economic voting case study. 
Economic voting is the study of the economy and how it affects political vote choice. At 
the heart of economic voting theory is the belief that average voters take into account how a 
government handles the economy and their perceptions of the current economic condition 
when voting (Anderson, 2010: 140). Simply put, it is argued that voters hold the incumbent 
government accountable for their current economic situation (Happy, 1986: 47). Economic 
voting research extends back to the 1960s and includes myriad studies from the United States, 
Europe, and Australia. Canadian researchers have also used economic voting theory as a way to 
understand federal vote choice (Happy, 1986, 1989, 1992; Gilineau and Belanger, 2005; Nadeau 
and Blais, 1993, Nadeau et al., 2000).  
While research has typically considered economic voting at the national or federal level, 
there has also been an interest in economic voting at the sub-state level (Stein, 1990; Svoboda, 
1995; Ebeid and Rodden, 2006; Remmer and Gelineau, 2005, Anderson, 2008). In Canada, 
however, there has been only limited study of provincial-level economic voting (Tellier, 2006; 
Gelineau and Belinger, 2005, 2011; Albert, 1976; Landry, 1984), and studies to date have been 
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limited to aggregate data. (As will be discussed in a later section, economic voting analysis can 
be conducted with aggregate or individual level data.)  
The minimal research on provincial economic voting is problematic, as provincial 
governments are key economic actors in Canada’s federal system. Constitutionally, the 
provinces handle many economic areas. Specifically, they have control over natural resources 
and taxes, direct taxation, economic development, provincial transportation, and business 
license issuing (Hale, 2006: 224). As such, provinces have significant control over the economy 
within their jurisdiction. Given this, voters should be expected to hold provincial governments 
accountable for economic issues.  Using Saskatchewan as a case study, this thesis will expand 
the study of provincial economic voting in Canada.  
1.1: Thesis Purpose, Research Question, Importance, and Methedology 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how, if at all, individual-level perceptions of 
economic conditions affected provincial vote choice decisions in the 2011 Saskatchewan 
election. Using individual level data from the 2011 Saskatchewan Election Study, the thesis 
examines the relationship between economic perceptions and vote choice.  
Past studies have indicated that governments have been rewarded for good economic 
times (Kramer, 1971: 140-141; Happy, 1986:53; Nadeau and Blais, 1993: 787).  Further, 
research indicates that it is individuals’ economic perceptions that influence vote choice, as the 
voters may not be taking into account truthful economic conditions when considering their 
vote choice. Negative impressions of the economy have been shown to hurt incumbent support 
when, in fact, the economy was not as bad as perceived (Nadeau et al., 2000: 87).  Given 
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previous research, as well as the importance of economic issues to the election, it is reasonable 
to expect that individual-level economic perceptions are correlated with vote choice in the 
2011 Saskatchewan election.  
In order to understand the effects of the economy on vote choice in the election the 
research question that will be discussed in the thesis is: 
To what extent did economic perceptions influence vote choice in the 2011 
Saskatchewan election?  
This question is important, as little is known about both Saskatchewan voter behaviour and 
how, if at all, it is affected by provincial economic voting. Examining this question will further 
the understanding of vote choice in Saskatchewan and economic voting at a provincial level. 
With this research question in mind, the hypothesis that will be considered in the data analysis 
used in this thesis is: 
- Positive economic perceptions will increase the odds of voting for the incumbent party 
in the 2011 Saskatchewan Election.  
In addition to understanding Saskatchewan vote choice, this thesis will advance the 
study of Canadian political behaviour. To date, there have only been a few studies on provincial 
economic voting in Canada, and none of these studies have considered Saskatchewan 
specifically. This thesis will fill a gap in that research. Due to the data set that will be employed, 
this thesis can determine whether voters’ subjective economic perceptions influence their vote 
choice and will contribute to the nascent study of sub-state economic voting. 
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This thesis will also to add to economic voting literature through its use of individual 
level data. Currently, the lion’s share of economic voting research is done using aggregate data. 
By focusing on individual data from the Saskatchewan Election Study, this research will be the 
first to consider the distinctions between sociotropic and egocentric economic perceptions at 
the provincial level. Sociotropic perceptions measure whether an individual considers society’s 
economic condition before their personal economic condition. Conversely, egocentric 
perceptions include whether an individual considers their personal economic condition before 
that of the greater society. The term sociotropic is used to describe an individual’s focus on 
society as a whole. For this thesis, sociotropic economic perceptions include an individual’s 
concern over society’s economic condition. The term egocentric involves an individual focusing 
on their personal situation. As such, egocentric economic perceptions involve an individual’s 
focus on their perceptions of their personal economic situation. It is important to understand 
that these individual-level perceptions exist concurrently and their level of importance can 
fluctuate over time. 
As well, the variable of leadership evaluations, which will be shown in this thesis to have 
a large effect on vote choice in the 2011 election, has only been sparsely considered in past 
economic voting literature. The inclusion of this variable in the data analysis will further add 
another unique facet to this thesis as well as economic voting literature on the whole. 
In order to answer the research question, survey data from the 2011 Saskatchewan 
Election Study will be used. This was an original telephone survey of 1,000 adult Saskatchewan 
residents, conducted by University of Saskatchewan researchers after the November 7, 2011 
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election. The analysis utilizes logistical regression analysis to determine the relationship 
between the economic perceptions variables and incumbent voting. Specifically, the 
multivariate analysis considers how sociotropic and egocentric economic perceptions (the 
independent variables) influence incumbent vote choice (the dependent variable), after 
controlling for standard sociodemographic variables (age, income, education and gender) and 
leadership evaluations.  
1.2: Chapters 
In consideration of the research question this thesis will include a review of the 
literature involving economic voting. Chapter two examines the theoretical background as well 
as variables that have consistently been used in economic voting studies. It also highlights 
relevant literature regarding economic perceptions. Chapter two also discusses the importance 
of leadership evaluations to vote choice – a topic seldom considered in the economic voting 
literature.  
Chapter three looks at the economic context of Saskatchewan for the two years leading 
up to the 2011 Saskatchewan Election. This chapter provides a comparison of Saskatchewan 
and Canada’s economy using many of the traditional and non-traditional measures of economic 
health. Additionally, this chapter outlines how the Saskatchewan Party and the opposition 
Saskatchewan New Democratic Party (NDP) dealt with and framed economic issues during the 
election campaign. A review of relevant government documents and news articles establishes 
that the economy was an important issue for Saskatchewan residents during the 2011 
Saskatchewan Election. 
Chapter four presents an original analysis of the 2011 Saskatchewan Election Study. This 
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chapter provides a detailed description of the key variables and then presents two logistic 
regression models to assess the relationship between the economic perception variables and 
vote choice. The analysis then moves to consider the additional variable of leadership 
evaluations to understand if economic perceptions were linked to leadership perceptions.  
Chapter five concludes the thesis, reiterates the empirical findings and suggests areas of 
further research. 
Through these chapters the effects of economic voting in the 2011 Saskatchewan 
election are explored and prove to be a very interesting case study on vote choice.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1: Introduction 
Economic voting theory argues that economic factors are relevant to vote choice. This 
method of analyzing vote choice has a vibrant history that extends to the 1960s. This chapter 
examines economic voting theory in detail.  First, to situate economic voting theory within the 
larger study of vote choice, the chapter presents a brief overview of the other dominant 
theories of vote choice: socio-demographics, campaign effects, strategic voting, partisanship, 
leadership evaluations and issue voting. Second, a more expanded review of economic voting 
theory is presented. Finally, this chapter ends with the justification of employing economic 
voting theory for the 2011 Saskatchewan election.  
2.2: Dominant Vote Choice Theories 
The study of vote choice has evolved over time with seven dominant theories: Socio-
demographics, partisanship, campaign effects, issue voting, leadership evaluations, strategic 
voting and economic voting. The research discussed below highlights each of these theories 
strengths and limitations. 
2.2.1: Socio-demographics 
 Political scientists have looked to socio-demographic variables to understand vote 
choice since the 1940s. This field of study concerns itself with studying voter income, religion, 
education, sex and age to understand if these variables are aligned with vote choice. The idea 
 9 
 
behind this approach was that certain combinations of socio-demographic variables would lead 
voters to cast ballots for particular parties.  
 Arguably, socio-demographic political research found its beginning with the Columbia 
School perspective. Using 600 respondents during the 1940s United States presidential 
election, Columbia University researchers surveyed each respondent up to seven times (Bartels, 
2008: 2). The results of their study found that voters made their vote choice long before the 
election campaign began (Parrella, 2010: 223). The data suggested that political parties and the 
media were not as influential as others believed in swaying voters to parties (Lazersfeld et al., 
1944: 121); rather, religion, socioeconomic status, and where voters lived influenced voters’ 
vote choices (Lazersfeld et al., 1944: 25-26). Voters were also found to be unchanging in their 
voting preferences throughout their lives, though the researchers noted that generational 
change may influence a change in vote choice over time (Lazersfeld et al., 1944: 142-145). This 
study pointed to a lack of influence of the media and campaigns and more towards a voter’s 
background as being an influential predictor of vote choice.  
 With the success of the Columbia school, researchers at the University of Michigan 
looked to replicate their results. The results, however, were not as strong as the original study 
(Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 3). Researchers at Michigan found that voters can change 
their vote choice despite little change in their socio-demographic realities (Anderson and 
Stephenson, 2010: 3). Short term effects were discovered to play a part of vote choice (Bartels, 
2008: 7). Michigan researchers noted that partisan attachments in the American electorate 
were strong (Campbell et al. 1964: 80-81); however, “candidate evaluation, issue evaluation, 
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campaign effects and conversations with family and friends” also influenced voting (Campbell 
et al. 1964: 24-25, 107-108,161-163). As well, researchers determined that voters’ social 
characteristics (ethnicity, race, religion, education, occupation, class, and parental partisanship) 
also affect vote choice (Campbell et al. 1964: 252-263). In order to account for causality, 
Campbell et al. used a “funnel of causality” to understand how a voter makes their voting 
decision at a specific moment in time (Campbell et al. 1964: 24). Essentially, the funnel begins 
with external (uncontrollable) non-political variables such as sex and age creating an attitudinal 
base; over time an individual evaluates a variety of events that are both non-political and 
political as well as external and personal and these particular situations can then influence 
personal and political attitude and behaviour (Campbell, 1964: 30). Stated more clearly, there is 
a trail of events that leads to a voting decision for an individual. The trail begins with an 
attitudinal base comprised of socio-economic factors; this base serves as a lens through which 
the individual views a variety of both political and non-political stimulus like new candidates or 
policy. Over time, the individual will make a political choice based on how they view the 
political and non-political stimuli. The researchers at Michigan summed up their findings in their 
acclaimed book, The American Voter, in which they argued that party identification and 
candidate evaluations played a large effect on vote choice (Campbell, 1964: 528, 543).  
The Michigan model and the Columbia school both explored the idea that socio-
demographics play a role when voters decide how to vote. The socio-demographic influences of 
ethnicity, race, region, religion, education, sex, occupation, parental partisanship, income and 
sex are linked to the creation of long term party identification, which in turn influences vote 
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choice. It is for this reason that researchers continue to include myriad socio-demographics as 
control variables when regression analysis is used to understand vote choice.  
While early research was deemed informative, recently socio-demographics have been 
found to be only “a remote contributor to vote choice” (Perrella, 2010: 222). However, 
Canadians have shown voting trends that are tied to socio-demographic categories, namely 
region, ethnicity, religion and gender (Parrella, 2010:223). While socio-demographic variables 
only play a small part in determining vote choice, their presence is nevertheless felt. Indeed, in 
economic voting models, these variables are still analyzed and used as a base model for 
interpretation before other variables are added into the regression equation. 
2.2.2: Partisanship 
Partisanship is best described as a “psychological link to [a] political party” (Clarke et al., 
1991: 46) and is an important determinant of vote choice. Socio-psychological theory notes that 
voters look for reference groups (such as political parties) that they feel reflect their personal 
attitudes and identity (LeDuc et al., 1982: 470); the more closely a voter feels to a particular 
political party, the more ‘partisan’ they are.  Naturally, it stands to reason that the more 
partisan a voter is, the greater the likelihood that the partisanship will influence that voter’s 
vote choice. Partisanship has been studied for some time as a determinant of vote choice, going 
back to the Michigan model where it was found to be important in American elections 
(Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 20).  
There has been a certain amount of debate as to the exact nature of partisanship in 
Canada, as the Canadian and American political systems differ in a variety of ways (Anderson 
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and Stephenson, 2010: 20). For Americans, partisanship, also considered party identification, 
indicates a strong loyalty to a particular political party (Campbell et al.,1964: 121). However, the 
American concept of partisanship is influenced by a variety of institutional contexts are not 
present in Canada like electoral primaries and multiple ballots (Clarke et al., 1991: 47). 
According to Clarke et al., Canadian partisanship is based on “stability over time, intensity of 
feeling, and consistency of such ties between federal and provincial levels” (1991:47). 
Importantly, Canadians have demonstrated changes in their partisanship over short periods of 
time. 
Initial studies on Canadian partisanship found that partisanship has been inconsistent 
when it comes to vote choice (LeDuc, 1982: 480, Clarke et al. 2000:51-52). One of the first 
studies to consider partisanship as factor in Canadian vote choice, by Clarke, Leduc, Jenson, and 
Pammet in 1979, found that partisanship in Canada could be “stable or variable” (Clarke et al., 
1979: 161). Durable partisans simply vote for the party they favor; flexible partisans are more 
likely to break partisan ties due to factors such as issues or the popularity of particular 
candidates (Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 21).  
More recently, however, the idea that Canadians lack partisan stability has been refuted 
by some scholars who demonstrate that partisanship is an important factor in vote choice. Blais 
et al. and Gidengil et al. found that partisan support for the Liberals was an important factor in 
the 2000 and 2004 elections (Blais et al., 2002: 123; Gidengil et al., 2006: 13). Belanger and 
Stephenson found that, from 1993 to 2006, partisans have different levels of intensity and 
loyalty: Liberals and Progressive Conservative partisans had very low levels of loyalty and 
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intensity; NDP partisans expressed higher levels of loyalty and intensity; and the Reform, 
Canadian Alliance and Bloc Quebecois partisans all exhibited high degrees of intensity and 
loyalty (Belanger and Stephenson, 2010: 130). Partisans of the current Conservative Party of 
Canada have been found to demonstrate similar levels of loyalty and intensity as the partisans 
of its parent parties (Reform and Alliance) (Belanger and Stephenson, 2010: 130). Interestingly, 
in terms of partisan stability, the Conservatives and the Liberals enjoy a reliable core of stable 
supporters, unlike the NDP or former Progressive Conservatives (Belanger and Stephenson, 
2010: 131).  
2.2.3: Campaign Effects 
Campaign effects can influence vote choice. Political parties use an election campaign to 
present their election platforms with the goal of attracting voters and gaining votes. If 
partisanship is flexible in Canada, as suggested by some scholars, the campaign should 
influence vote choice. Indeed, Fournier et al. note that, during the 1997 election, only 49 
percent of voters had reached an electoral decision before the beginning of the election 
campaign; the rest of voters decided only within three weeks of the election date (2001: 97-98). 
The research suggests that campaign effects can be relevant, but their influence varies 
between voters. Blais et al. note that during the 1997 election the Leaders’ debate and a media 
advertisement about leaders from Quebec had an effect on vote intentions, but these effects 
were only temporary (Blais et al., 1999: 230-204). Fournier et al. contend that campaign effects 
only affect undecided voters, and voters who knew their voting intentions before the campaign 
were not affected (2004: 675).  Nadeau et al. note, much like Fournier et al., that different 
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voters are susceptible to different kinds of information from an election campaign (2008: 242). 
Interestingly, they found that voters who were informed the least were influenced by paltry 
information about leaders, whereas midlevel informed voters responded more to information 
on issues (Nadeau et al, 2008: 242). Nadeau et al. concur with work done by Lupia and 
McCubbins that voters with high levels of information respond to complex arguments (2008: 
242). Nadeau et al.’s work suggests that voters with low levels of information during a 
campaign are affected by campaign effects, which refutes earlier work which suggested that 
low information voters gained little to no information during a campaign (2008: 243).  
 Along with the campaign, the leader’s debate has been shown to have mixed results on 
swaying vote choice. Parrella notes that debates generally do not have much of an effect on 
vote choice as partisans will favor their favorite party’s leader (Parrella, 2006: 241). However, 
Blais et al. found that in the 2000 election the debate helped the Conservative party greatly, 
noting that 43% of people who watched the debate felt Joe Clark won and the debate was 
linked to the Conservatives holding on the their official party status (2003: 48-49). Overall, 
election campaigns appear to have an effect on vote choice, though some campaigns and 
elections have different effects depending on the context, issues and political personalities of 
the day. 
2.2.4: Issue Voting 
Linked to campaign effects is the concept of issue voting as another determinant of vote 
choice. Issue voting occurs when parties align themselves with particular issues that are 
important to voters. This could include a party’s particular stance on health care, taxes or other 
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important issues that are politically relevant. Largely discredited as a determinant of vote 
choice by the Michigan school due to a lack of substantial evidence in the elections they 
studied, more contemporary scholars have come to understand that issue voting does have an 
effect on vote choice (Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 3-5). Issue voting can only happen if the 
political parties have distinct positions on an issue; if parties are too similar, voters will 
disregard their issue positions (Anderson and Stephenson 2010: 5).  
Issues have been shown to play a role in vote choice. Fournier et al. found that voters 
will evaluate the incumbent government with more scrutiny over issues that the voter 
considers important (Fournier et al., 2003: 63). Several issues have been found to be important 
in Canadian elections. The 1988 election found that free trade was an important issue with 
Gidengil noting that the election was “a virtual referendum on the issue” (2000b: 9). Health 
care and the powers of the federal government were shown to have an effect in the 2000 
elections, though the impact of those issues was quite small (Blais et al., 2002a: 153). The 1997 
election saw the Reform party gain support from its position on fiscal responsibility in the West 
whereas the Liberals gained support for job creation in the West and the East and the future of 
the economy in Ontario (Gidengil, 1999: 20). In 2004, the most important issue was health care, 
particularly ‘two tiered’ health care, and the NDP’s position on that issue was shown to benefit 
the party (Gidengil et al., 2006: 17-18). Also in the 2004 election, the sponsorship scandal had a 
significant effect on voters that were still upset with the Liberals (Gidengil et al., 2009: 7). In 
2008, the Liberals were hurt by their environmental “green shift” plan, but only marginally 
(Gidengil et al., 2009: 7). Together, the evidence from past elections suggests that issue voting 
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does happen in Canada. Arguably, the more salient the issue is, the more effect it will have on a 
voter’s electoral choice. 
One interesting dimension of issue voting is ownership. Issue ownership occurs when a 
party tries to gain support by informing voters of issues that the party has had past success in 
resolving (Belanger and Meguid, 2005: 3). In Canada, Belanger notes that, over a 50 year 
period, issue ownership has been linked to certain parties at particular times. Notably, Belanger 
noticed that, after the Diefenbaker and Mulroney administrations, the Liberals experienced 
rises in competency rates on particular issues (2003: 554). For example, after the economic 
issues of the 1980s, the Liberals under Chretien were publicly perceived to be more competent 
than the Progressive Conservative Party at looking after the economy and unemployment, so 
much so that no other party could have challenged them on those issues (Belanger, 2003: 555). 
In regards to other parties, Belanger notes that the NDP and the Bloc Quebecois (BQ) were 
“issue parties” but the issues they stand for, “Canada’s social conscious and Sovereignty” 
respectively, defined them so rigidly that they were seen as only competent with those issues 
and no others (2003: 555). The Reform/Canadian Alliance parties were viewed as being 
grounded on the issue that brought them into being: a western regional party (Belanger, 2003: 
555-556). The experience of the NDP, BQ, Canadian Alliance and the Reform party’s indicates 
that new or ‘third’ parties have a hard job of convincing the electorate that they are viable 
options to handle important issues (Belanger, 2003: 556). Overall, research suggests that issues 
do play a role in vote choice, with the relevance of issue voting depending on how salient the 
issue has become with voters.   
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An important question that should be addressed is whether or not economic voting, the 
theory which drives this thesis, is simply a derivation of issue voting. As will be detailed later in 
the chapter, economy voting theory looks at the economy and its effect on vote choice, and 
does not examine whether or not the economy is presented as a salient issue. Indeed, in some 
elections the economy may not be presented as an issue during an election at all. Additionally, 
economic voting generally looks at the economy as a whole and its combined effect on vote 
choice; issue voting, on the other hand, tends to be more focused. For example, issue voting 
during a particular election may focus strictly on the issue of employment and not other 
economic factors.  
2.2.5 Valence Politics Model 
 The valence model takes a slightly different take on electoral vote choice. According to 
Clarke et al., issues are an important consideration in vote choice; they note that individuals 
tend to take into account broad policy issues like the economy or health care and evaluate 
which party will do the best job to provide these (2009: 12). Valence politics also discusses the 
importance of party leadership. Clarke et al. note that voters use the image of party leaders to 
guide their decision making process during an election (2009: 12). These voters understand that 
they may not be informed enough to understand all the issues but trust in party leaders to 
advance the voters’ goals. The valence politics model has been found in a number of elections 
studied by Clarke et al. Specifically, the election of both Brian Mulroney in the 1980s and the 
rise of the Liberal Party in the 1990s could be contributed to the proper handling of valence 
politics and how the respective parties handled the image of their leaders (Clarke et al., 2009: 
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238).  They also found evidence of valence issues playing an important role in the 2006 
Canadian election, and leadership evaluations, which play an important part in the valence 
model, were found to hurt the Liberal Party in the early 2000s with the Sponsorship Scandal, to 
the subsequent benefit of the Conservative Party of Canada (Clarke et al., 2009:97). Conversely, 
Clarke et al. found that the Conservative Party of Canada lost its grip on valence issues, 
leadership and partisanship, and that this may have hurt their chances for a majority 
government in 2008 (Clarke et al., 2011: 448). Research has also found evidence of valence 
politics in American elections.  Clarke et al. found that both valence issues and leadership were 
important to the election of Reagan in the 1980s (2009: 238) and during the 2004 Presidential 
election (2009: 133). As well, the handling of valence issues by the Democrats in 2006 helped 
lead them to decisive majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate (Clarke et al., 
2009: 197). The evidence would suggest that valence politics are in play in North America and 
may have significant insights on how people vote. 
2.2.6: Leadership Evaluations 
As the valence politics model demonstrates, leadership evaluations are important and 
there is a body of work to suggest that they, on their own, have deciding influences on vote 
choice. Parrella notes that political parties are often “defined by their leaders” (2010: 240). 
Gidengil et al. found evidence that leaders are a strong determinant of vote choice after looking 
at Canadian Election Studies over a 30 year time span (2000a: 14). In her analysis of Canadian 
Election Study data from 1988-2006, Bittner found that the traits of leadership were a factor in 
vote choice as well, but not to the same extent as partisanship, and a leader’s perceived 
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character was more important than perceptions of competency (2010: 200). Looking at specific 
elections, leadership evaluations had a large effect on vote choice in the 2000 (Blais et al., 
2002a: 175) and 2004 elections (Gidengil, 2006: 18). As it stands, leadership evaluations do 
seem to influence vote choice in Canada. 
2.2.7: Strategic Voting 
Strategic voting has also been considered in Canadian vote choice. Strategic voting 
occurs when a voter whose preferred candidate will likely lose chooses to vote for another 
candidate who stands a better chance of defeating the candidate they dislike the most 
(Parrella, 2010: 242). In order to satisfy this definition, Blais et al. notes that a voter must not 
want to ‘waste’ their vote and they must not vote for their preferred candidate (2009: 14). 
Canada has a history of three or more national parties competing for a majority vote and this 
creates the perfect conditions for strategic voting. However, research on strategic voting has 
shown mixed results. A look at the 1988 and 1997 elections noted that there was little evidence 
of strategic voting in those elections (Blais, 2002b: 450; Blais et al., 2001: 349-350). A 
comparison of Canadian elections from 1988-2000 and the 2005 British election found that, 
again, strategic voting was present but low; only between 2-5 percent of voters voted 
strategically (Blais et al., 2009: 22). Pursuant to this outlook on vote choice, Blais and Turgeon 
discovered that half of voters could identify the party least likely to win in their constituency 
(2003: 1). Furthermore, it was found that well informed voters were more likely to pick the 
losing party (Blais and Turgeon, 2003: 1). It appears that strategic voting in Canada does occur, 
but at a low level.  
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2.2.8: Summary 
The research available suggests that a number of factors influence Canadians’ vote 
choices; of course, these factors are not always active in each election. For example, during 
some elections issues are an important factor and for others it might be leadership evaluations. 
As such, finding a single theory of vote choice is problematic and presents difficulty in 
identifying voter behavior in multiple elections.  
It should be noted that some researchers have attempted to combine the various 
determinants of vote choice into a single model. The ‘block recursive’ model employs many of 
the theories mentioned above including “socio-demographics, partisanship, issues, leadership 
and campaign dynamics” (Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 13). Much like the funnel of 
causality, the block recursive model starts with socio-demographics as a beginning point 
(Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 14). From this point, other “blocks” are added sequentially so 
researchers can note statistical changes in the model and identify “long term predispositions 
and short term and proximate variables” (Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 14). As each block is 
entered into the model, only the blocks that are statistically significant are retained in the 
model and thus researchers can better understand the effect these blocks have on each other 
and how they influence vote choice (Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 14).  
 The block recursive model has allowed researchers to consider the interplay of various 
independent variables and the temporal order of these variables. While this is a very valuable 
tool in understanding vote choice, it does have critics. The first critique is that the variables are 
not derived deductively and, as Shapiro notes, “ the variations in their effects across elections 
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must be reckoned with in any future theories that might be developed (Shapiro, 1997: 314). 
Second, critics have noted that the block recursive model fails to fully incorporate campaign 
and media effects (Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 14). As Brody has noted, the media and 
politicians’ actions create impressions that voters then use to create their candidate 
preferences (Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 14). Finally, the block recursive model cannot 
indicate the “relative importance of different blocks of independent variables” (Anderson and 
Stephenson, 2010: 14). Simply put, the model notes that all blocks in the regression, used in the 
block recursive model, are important but this model fails to note a theory to allow researchers 
to predict the effects of variables in the model (Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 14). 
2.3: Economic Voting Theory 
Absent from the preceding discussion of vote choice research is the topic of economic 
voting, which will be the focus of this thesis. The following section will highlight the beginnings 
and evolution of the theory and applications of economic voting in Canada and other countries. 
Of particular importance to this thesis is the discussion of subjective economic perceptions and 
the role of party leadership. 
Economic voting research examines the relationship between the economy and vote 
choice or the popularity of governments. This body of research has been evolving since the 
1970s and economic voting theories have been tested in a number of countries. Over time, 
researchers have refined measurement and debated how economic factors influence individual 
attitudes and behaviours. While research continues, economic voting theory has made an 
important contribution to the study of political behaviour.  
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Economic voting theory began with Anthony Downs’s seminal work, An Economic 
Theory of Democracy (1957). Downs argues that voters make rational decisions when voting to 
determine which party will give them the most utility, with ‘utility’ defined as the economic and 
political benefits that a voter receives from voting for a party (1957: 36-37). Voters use their 
perceptions of utility to assess the current government; if their personal utility is perceived as 
high, voters will vote for the incumbent government, whereas if their personal utility is 
perceived as low, voters will cast a vote against the incumbent government (Downs, 1957: 38-
39).  
Downs also argues that rational voters will use their perceptions of current conditions, 
more so than their expectations for the future, to inform their vote choice (1957: 40). This is 
not to say that voters do not consider the future; rather, voters consider what they believe will 
happen in the future and use this prediction to modify their vote choice (Downs. 1957: 40). The 
voter will consider the current trend of government decision making and, if it appears to be 
positive, will continue to support them (Downs, 1957: 41). If the voter is unable to accurately 
determine, based on policy, which party is a better choice for their personal utility, he will make 
his decision based simply on which government h e believes will do a better job (Downs, 1957: 
41). Downs also considers the amount of information a voter will procure. He argues that voters 
tend to find information sources that meet their political ends and will procure only as much 
information as they deem necessary (Downs, 1957: 219). This information will respond to the 
voters’ biases and mold their perspective of their vote choice (Downs, 1957: 219).  
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Downs’ theoretical approach to voters and their economic perceptions naturally 
challenged other academics to test this relationship empirically. Such studies have been 
completed in a variety of countries, including Canada. There are two dominant approaches to 
the study of economic voting: objective models, which use aggregate economic indicators to 
examine the relationship between economic conditions and either electoral outcomes or party 
popularity; and subjective models, which use individual-level survey data to correlate 
individuals’ economic perceptions with vote choice or party popularity. Research using both 
approaches suggests support for the general argument that the economy matters for voting. 
2.4: Economic Voting Research: Objective Economic Indicators 
Economic voting analyses utilizing objective economic indicators have been used for 
more than four decades. While many researchers before the 1970s noted a relationship 
between the economy and voting, their studies only used simplistic statistical examinations and 
utilized mostly qualitative data (Kramer, 1971: 64). However, the legacies of the first studies 
continue, as many of the economic variables examined are still used today. Over time, these 
variables have been put through more rigorous statistical analyses than found in the earlier 
academic work. Objective economic indicators have generally been compared to two different 
dependent variables: electoral outcomes (that is, reelection or defeat of the incumbent 
government) and public opinion data on the popularity of the incumbent party (Kramer 1971; 
Goodheart and Bhansali, 1971). These two approaches are referred to as ‘vote functions’ and 
‘popularity functions’, respectively. Regardless of approach, the two objective economic 
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indicators shown to have the most consistent effect on voting are unemployment and inflation 
(Nannestad and Paldam, 1994: 216). 
2.4.1: Vote Function Research 
The vote function “explains the vote, or change in the vote, of a government at 
elections, by (the change in) economic and political variables” (Nannestad and Paldam, 1997: 
214).1 The dependent variable is votes for the incumbent political party, measured either 
through aggregate electoral returns data or individual level survey data. Key objective economic 
indicators that are studied include unemployment, real and nominal income, inflation, and 
taxes (Kramer, 1971; Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970; Muller, 1970; Happy, 1986, 1989, 1992). 
Many economic voting studies focus on unemployment. The unemployment rate is a 
number that is easily understood by the public, frequently reported in the media, and an 
important objective measure of the national economic performance (Anderson, 2010: 148). 
Studies of the relationship between unemployment and incumbent vote choice present mixed 
results. Studies of American federal voting using aggregate electoral returns data as the 
dependent variable have found that the unemployment rate is not a statistically significant 
predictor of vote choice (Kramer 1971: 139; Powell and Whitten, 1993: 395; Lewis-Beck, 1986: 
337); this result has also been demonstrated in Canada (Happy, 1986: 49; Happy, 1986: 389; 
Anderson, 2010: 149; Carmichael, 1988: 723). However, studies using individual level survey 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that the definitions of the vote and popularity functions each make mention of political 
variables. However, as “many political variables are defined qualitatively and in an asymmetrical way” the political 
variables “must consequently be entered differently into these functions” (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994: 216). 
Stated more simply, political variables are unique to each election.  For this reason, discussion of political variables 
is omitted in the literature summary presented here.  
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data, with self-reported voting as the dependent variable, offer competing results. Some 
studies found that unemployment has no effect in congressional elections for the United States 
(Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979: 504, Fiorina, 1978:437-438), but other studies in Canada, the United 
States and Denmark have found the opposite, noting that unemployment can be a statistically 
significant factor in vote choice (Happy, 1992: 124; Nannestad and Paldam, 1997: 130; Fiorina, 
1978:437-438). Another Canadian study found that the unemployment rate did not influence 
vote choice between 1974 and 1980, but was relevant for the 1984 federal election when high 
unemployment was attributed to the Liberal party and voters favored the Conservatives 
(Archer and Johnson, 1988: 583).  
Inflation has also been shown to have an influence on economic voting. Like 
unemployment, inflation is a high profile measure of national economic performance; voters 
not only hear and read about inflation in the media, but also experience inflation at a personal 
level as prices for goods rise or fall. As such, high inflation should lead to lower voting for and 
popularity of an incumbent government (Gelineau and Belanger, 2005: 409). Researchers have 
found that inflation, like unemployment, has a varied relationship with voting behavior. Some 
studies using aggregate electoral returns data found that inflation influences vote choice in 
Canadian federal elections (Gelineau and Belanger, 2005: 414; Happy, 1992: 124) and 
internationally (Lewis-Beck, 1986: 376-377), while other studies find that inflation was not a 
statistically significant predictor of vote choice federal elections (Kramer, 1971: 141; Powell and 
Whitten, 1993: 397; Carmichael, 1988: 723) or provincial elections (Gelineau and Belenger, 
2005: 419). Individual level studies using self-reported vote choice as the dependent variable 
also provide mixed results: inflation has been found to be a significant predictor of voting 
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behaviour in Canada (Happy, 1992: 124) and a non-significant predictor of voting behaviour in 
Denmark (Nannestad and Paldam, 1997: 130). American studies also present mixed results, 
with inflation being statistically insignificant for congressional elections in 1962 and 1972, and 
statistically significant in the 1972 presidential election (Fiorina, 1978:437-438). 
As my thesis will examine provincial economic voting specifically, it is important to 
single out the only provincial economic voting study that addresses the vote function. Analysis 
of aggregate provincial and federal Canadian data from 1953 to 2001 found that the provincial 
and national unemployment rate and the inflation rate were statistically significant predictors 
of vote choice at a provincial level (Gelineau and Belanger, 2005); further, it was found that the 
federal unemployment rate was a more important influence on vote choice than was the 
provincial unemployment rate (Gelineau and Belanger, 2005: 418). 
Currently, the only specific province in which economic voting has been studied is 
Quebec. Of the three studies that have been done, they all show that economic factors have 
been a large determinant in vote choice for several elections. Albert found that labor unrest 
and high unemployment was a deciding factor in the Parti Quebecois’s defeat of the Parti 
Liberal du Quebec in the 1976 election (Albert, 1976), and studies of Quebec between 1970-
1981 provincial elections indicated that Down’s economic voting worked (Landry, 1984). 
Similarly, Belanger and Gelineau found that the Parti Liberal du Quebec’s handling of the 
economy during the recession of 2008 seemed to convince voters to re-elect the party (2011). 
Though there are limited provincial studies on economic voting, economic factors do appear to 
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be relevant to vote choice. As such, it is reasonable to assume that economic voting does occur 
in Saskatchewan. 
2.4.2: Popularity Function Research 
Similar to the vote function, the popularity function explains how the popularity of the 
governing party changes with changes in economic and political conditions (Nannestad and 
Paldam, 1997: 214). As with vote function research, popularity function research often focuses 
on two objective economic indicators: unemployment and inflation.  
Studies of the relationship between government popularity and the unemployment rate 
have had mixed results. Early studies indicated that unemployment is a significant predictor of 
government popularity (Mueller, 1970: 34), although Goodhart and Bhansali’s research found 
there may be a time lag before voters attribute the unemployment rate to the government 
(1970: 59). Another study that examined the relationship between the unemployment rate and 
the popularity of various Canadian political parties between 1954 and 1979 found that 
unemployment was a statistically significant predictor of the New Democratic Party’s 
popularity, but not for the popularity of the Liberal or Conservative parties (Monroe and 
Erikson, 1986: 633-637). More recently, a Canadian study examining the relationship between a 
number of objective economic indicators and the popularity of incumbent provincial 
governments found that unemployment was the only statistically significant economic variable 
(Tellier, 2006, 35). 
The relationship between party popularity and inflation has also been examined. A 
study of Canadian political party popularity between 1954 and 1979 found that inflation is a 
 28 
 
statistically insignificant predictor of party popularity (Monroe and Erikson, 1986: 633-637). 
Similarly, Tellier’s Canadian provincial study also found inflation to be statistically insignificant 
(2006: 35). However, inflation was shown to be influential in determining government 
popularity in Britain (Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970: 61).  
To summarize, regardless of whether one considers the vote function or the popularity 
function, economic voting research has found that the unemployment rate and inflation can be 
important objective economic indicators, but their influence on vote choice and party 
popularity varies depending on the election in question.  
2.5: Economic Voting Research: Subjective Economic Perceptions 
In addition to studies of objective economic conditions, researchers have also 
considered the influence of individuals’ subjective perceptions of the economy on voting 
behaviour. Perception is an important consideration when looking at economic voting. Indeed, 
the voters’ perceptions of the economy may differ from economic reality. This is possible 
because individual perceptions of the economy may be based on a broad range of factors, 
rather than just traditional economic indicators such as unemployment and inflation. For 
example, voters may factor in non-traditional economic variables such as food bank usage rates 
and income inequality measures into their assessments of the economy.  
Researchers distinguish between two broad types of economic perceptions, sociotropic 
and egocentric, and two broad timeframes, retrospective and prospective. The term 
sociotropic, coined by Paul E. Meehl, means to take the national or public economic interest 
into consideration rather than one’s personal economic reality (1977: 14). Egocentric, also 
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described by Meehl, is the opposite; one takes into account their personal needs rather than 
those of society as a whole (1977: 16). These terms were first applied to economic voting by 
Kinder and Kiewit (1979: 523). Sociotropic and egocentric perceptions can be based on past 
assessments (retrospective) or future expectations (prospective). In the economic voting 
literature, the distinction between retrospective and prospective perceptions is important as 
voters will take into account how well they did economically under a current government, as 
well as how well they expect to do economically in the future under the same government, or 
another party (Nadeau et al., 2000: 79).  
To clarify, then, there are four types of economic perceptions that can be considered: 
 Retrospective sociotropic: Voters’ assessments of how past government actions 
have benefited the national (or provincial) economy;  
 Prospective sociotropic: Voters’ expectations of how future government actions 
will benefit the national (or provincial) economy; 
 Retrospective egocentric: Voters’ assessments of how past government actions 
have benefited the voter’s personal economic situation; and 
 Prospective egocentric: Voters’ assessments of how future government actions 
will benefit the voter’s personal economic situation. 
While some studies examine all four types of economic perceptions, most survey datasets 
include only one or two measures of economic perception, and as a result studies are often 
limited to a more narrow analysis. 
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International studies suggest that economic perceptions often matter to voting and to 
party popularity. A study of presidential approval in the United States from 1954-1988 found 
that prospective and retrospective sociotropic perceptions influenced approval ratings, 
whereas retrospective and prospective egocentric perceptions did not (Clarke and Stewart, 
1994: 1116). A similar study of presidential, congressional and senate vote choice for the 1984 
and 1988 elections, however, found mixed results: presidential voting in 1984 was influenced 
by retrospective sociotropic perceptions exclusively, but both retrospective sociotropic and 
retrospective egocentric perceptions influenced presidential voting in 1988; congressional 
voting in 1984 and 1988 was influenced by retrospective sociotropic perceptions (Lanoue, 1994: 
198-199); and senate voting was influenced by retrospective sociotropic perceptions in 1984 
but not in 1988 (Lanoue, 1994: 198-199). In all of the elections considered in that study, both 
prospective sociotropic and prospective egocentric perceptions failed achieve statistically 
significance (Lanoue, 1994: 198-199). Danish studies of national elections from 1990-1993 have 
found that retrospective egocentric perceptions have greater influence on vote choice than do 
retrospective sociotropic perceptions (Nannestad and Paldam, 1995: 57), and a similar study of 
Denmark voting from 1986-1992 found that retrospective egocentric perceptions are more 
influential on vote choice than are prospective egocentric perceptions (Nannestad and Paldam, 
1997: 127). A study of Britain found that all four types of perceptions affect vote choice, with 
retrospective sociotropic and prospective sociotropic perceptions having greater influence 
(Anderson et al., 2004: 12-15).  
Canadian studies have also considered economic perceptions and voting behaviour. 
Nadeau et al.’s study of the 1997 federal election found that all four types of perception 
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influence vote choice, with prospective and retrospective sociotropic voting perceptions having 
greater influence (Nadeau et al., 2000: 81). An analysis of federal elections from 1988-2006 
found that all four types of economic perceptions influence incumbent vote choice to some 
degree, with sociotropic perceptions having more impact than egocentric perceptions, and 
prospective sociotropic perceptions being be more salient then retrospective ones (Anderson, 
2010: 155). To date, Canadian research has yet to consider the relationship between economic 
perceptions and vote choice at the provincial level. This represents a large gap in provincial 
economic voting literature.  
To summarize, research on the relationship between economic perceptions and vote 
choice suggests that individual level perceptions of the economy do influence vote choice. 
Although retrospective sociotropic perceptions appear to have the greatest influence over vote 
choice, other types of economic perceptions have also been found to be relevant. 
2.6: Leadership Evaluations and Economic Voting 
As noted earlier, leadership evaluations have been found to be an important 
determinant of vote choice in Canada. To what extent are leadership evaluations influenced by 
economic perceptions? As it stands, leadership has not played a large role in past studies on 
subjective economic perceptions or economic voting. Still, there are some studies that have 
demonstrated that leadership has a role to play when discussing the economy and vote choice.  
Nadeau et al. found that leadership had a significant impact on their economic voting 
model (Nadeau et al., 2000: 81).  However, these variables did not outweigh economic 
perceptions and did not garner any discussion within their article (Nadeau et al., 2000: 82); 
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indeed, Nadeau et al. used leadership strictly as a control variable and did not consider it as a 
dependent variable (Nadeau et al., 2000: 81). Clarke and Kornberg also discussed the effects of 
economic perceptions on leadership and party evaluations during the 1988 Canadian national 
election. (It should be noted that they looked at Progressive Conservative party support as their 
dependent variable and they created a federal party identification control variable by 
“averaging the thermometer scores for the federal party and its leader, Prime Minister 
Mulroney” (Clarke and Kornberg, 1992: 47).) While they could not ascertain the specific effect 
of leadership in their regression equation, they did find that there was a positive relationship 
between federal and provincial Progressive Conservative party identification and Progressive 
Conservative party support (Clarke and Kornberg, 1992: 47). Their analysis suggests, albeit 
indirectly, that leadership factors play a part in economic voting. 
There have been a few studies that have looked directly at leadership evaluations and 
their effect on economic perceptions. Svoboda, looking at gubernational elections for 1982 and 
1986 in the United States, found that both Presidential and Governor evaluations help 
determine voter’s retrospective economic perceptions (Svoboda, 1995: 146).2 Nadeau and 
Blais, while testing to see if Canadian incumbent federal governments are more likely re-elected 
while the economy is favorable found that the outcomes of elections are highly influenced by 
both leadership evaluations and economic conditions (Nadeau and Blais, 1995: 216). As Nadeau 
and Blais simply note, “economic conditions do matter, but they matter in conjunction with 
Canadians’ judgment about the personal qualities and defects of party leaders” (Nadeau and 
                                                          
2 This research did not focus on the relationship between leadership evaluations and economic perceptions; 
instead, presidential and governor evaluations were among the control variables in a model predicting economic 
perceptions. 
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Blais, 1995: 216). Interestingly, Nadeau and Blais found that leadership evaluations and 
economic conditions had only a minor relation to each other and predominantly act 
independently (Nadeau and Blais, 1995: 216).  
The information above indicates that in a few studies leadership has been shown to 
have a significant impact on vote choice and economic voting. However, this particular variable 
appears to be underrepresented in many studies discussing economic perceptions and 
economic voting in general; more work in this area would be a valuable expansion of economic 
voting theory.  
2.7: Challenges to Economic Voting Theory 
Economic voting theory is not without its critics. Economic voting presumes that voters 
vote based on personal utility, considering (at least in part) how their vote choice relates to the 
good of society (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 47). However, Green and Shapiro argue that the 
public benefit of voting is not rational since a single vote is not likely to sway election results 
(1994: 47). (The fact that people still vote despite this ‘irrationality’ is known as the paradox of 
voting (Anderson and Stephenson, 2010: 12).)  Another critique of economic voting theory is a 
lack of complete information held by the voter. Economic voting theory assumes that voters 
acquire enough information to assess how the policy platforms of the various political parties 
would impact upon their personal utility, but Hauptmann notes that for voters to acquire 
information about political parties has a cost and there is little incentive for voters to pay these 
‘information costs’ to keep informed (Hauptman, 1996: 30). Hauptmann also argues that the 
information that voters do acquire to make voting decisions may be vague as party policies may 
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be too similar (1996: 30). Indeed, even if voters are informed, they still may not act rationally 
and the information they received may be incorrect. As such, voters may not always act in the 
way that economic voting theory predicts (Dyck, 2008: 14). 
2.8: Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the dominant theories on vote choice. Indeed, the 
information also presents a number of advantages to exploring economic voting theory. As the 
literature on economic voting has shown, economic voting theory utilizes many aspects 
discussed in other theories as control variables; namely campaign effects, valence issues, and 
socio-demographic variables. In this regard economic voting allows for these variables to be 
added into models so social scientists can consider their impact, making economic voting 
theory very versatile. Further, economic voting has a long research history with a strong 
theoretical foundation. While the block recursive model is promising and could be adapted to 
look at economic voting if needed, the lack of theory underpinning the model is a clear 
limitation of that approach. Additionally, more work is needed to understand the order of 
variables and how to operationalize variables like campaign and media effects. For this reason, 
economic voting is an appropriate choice for this thesis.  
To summarize, economic voting is a significant and robust area of study. While there 
may be other ways to analyze vote choice, economic voting has shown a solid history of 
advancement and evolution. Yet while the literature on economic voting is vast, there are 
significant gaps in the study of economic voting in Canada. In particular, few studies have 
considered the provincial perspective. Furthermore, at this time, no studies have examined the 
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relationship between provincial economic perceptions and voting. These gaps present the 
opportunity both to expand the study of economic voting and to advance the understanding of 
provincial political behavior. This thesis strives to address these research gaps.   
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Chapter 3: Saskatchewan’s Economic Context 
3.1: Introduction 
The 2011 Saskatchewan Election study found that many Saskatchewan residents 
believed that the economy had gotten better in the previous year (Atkinson et al, 2011:6). 
Before considering the impact of such evaluations on vote choice, it is important to assess if 
these opinions of the economy were indeed accurate. This chapter lays forth the contextual 
landscape for the 2011 Saskatchewan election. Specifically, this chapter outlines the objective 
economic reality of Saskatchewan for the two years prior to the 2011 election and considers 
how this context might have affected resident’s perceptions of the economy. This chapter 
begins with an economic comparison of Saskatchewan and Canada’s more traditional economic 
measures (gross domestic product, unemployment and inflation). Next, this chapter discusses 
many of the non-traditional economic measures that are not generally captured with traditional 
measures, including food bank usage, poverty, and affordable housing. Finally, the discussion 
turns to the political-economic context in which the 2011 Saskatchewan election was held – 
that is, public opinion and the economic rhetoric used by the political parties during the 
election campaign. The main body of literature for this chapter comes from newspaper articles 
and government documents that would have been readily available to the public. This chapter 
does not purport to suggest that such articles and documents definitively influenced economic 
perceptions in the 2011 Saskatchewan Election Study. Unfortunately there was no variable in 
the data set which could be used to investigate the relationship between the media and 
perceptions. The crux of this chapter is to understand why Saskatchewan residents might have 
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found the issue of the economy important and to understand if their perceptions were in fact 
appropriate for the province in the two years prior to the election.  
3.2: Traditional Economic Measures 
As chapter 2 noted, there are many different measures of the economy and these have 
been used in a variety of studies on economic voting and perceptions. Traditional measures of 
the economy typically include gross domestic product (GDP), inflation and the unemployment 
rate. These traditional measures are important as they are generally reported in the media and 
compared often with other provinces or the nation itself. They are also easy for voters to 
understand and evaluate. In this regard, they make good economic measures in which to 
understand the economic context of Saskatchewan. 
In order to fully understand Saskatchewan’s economic condition over the 2010 and 2011 
period it is important to consider how the nation as a whole was also economically fairing. The 
inclusion of Canada’s economic reality is important. Due to the federal nature of the country 
there are two sets of economic information the public must consider: the country as a whole, 
and the province. When Canada’s economy is discussed in the media, it is often broken down 
into comparative provincial economic statistics. These provincial statistics are then usually 
compared to the national average. As such, any disparity between Canada and the province is 
often contrasted when the media discusses the economy. There are times when a province 
exceeds the national average on a variety of economy indicators and thus differentiates itself 
above other provinces or the nation as a whole. In this regard, the residents of a province may 
 38 
 
take a certain amount of pride in being economically well off and this can influence their 
perceptions.3  
The coverage of news articles and government statistics to be discussed will begin in 
2010 and go to the beginning of November in 2011, the month of the Saskatchewan election. 
However, the 2008 economic crisis should be recognized before this discussion as this event 
had long term consequences for the economy. The subprime mortgage crisis in the United 
States had global ramifications in various financial sectors. Canada, like most countries, was 
affected and slipped into recession in 2008 as the national GDP growth rate fell to 0.7 percent 
(Beauchense, 2009: D1). At the end of 2008 the economy “shrank at an annualized rate of 3.4 
percent in the fourth quarter” (McMullan and Vieira, 2009: A.1). Economic recovery would 
occur in Canada in 2009 with the recession ending by the third quarter (Abma, 2009: C3).  
Indeed, by June nearly 50 percent of Canadian residents appeared to be optimistic that the 
economy was going to get better (“Canadians confidence”, 2009: D3). Another poll noted that 
28% of Canadians had either lost their jobs or someone in their family had in 2009; conversely, 
14% of people noted they received a job in 2009 (Mayeda, 2009: B1).  
Media attention on the economy was significant. The much discussed recession became 
the top news story of 2008 and many newspaper editors noted that the recession affected 
everyone in many forms (Johnson, 2009: A11). As Rob Roberts of the National Post stated, 
nearly every news story was viewed vis-à-vis the economy (Johnson, 2009: A11). For 2009, the 
economic mood in the press, noting the end of the recession as well as individual opinion data, 
                                                          
3 For a full chart of these traditional economic measures, please see Appendix A. 
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appeared to move from economic uncertainty to positive recovery. This turbulent economic 
reality is important to consider as we discuss 2010 and 2011. Without the economic turmoil of 
2008 and the slow recovery of 2009, we cannot fully understand the economic reality that 
affected Canada and the provinces in 2010 and 2011. With this economic environment 
understood, the comparison of Saskatchewan and Canada can be better understood.  
 Canada and Saskatchewan’s Comparative Economic Context 
This section of the chapter will involve a comparison of traditional economic measures 
between Canada and Saskatchewan. The purpose of the comparison is to evaluate the 
economic differences between the two orders of government and confirm that Saskatchewan, 
compared to the country, was indeed enjoying good economic times.  
3.2.1: GDP 
Starting with GDP growth, 2010 saw the Canadian economy improving but it was still a 
long way from the pre-2008 economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected a 
favorable outlook for Canada in the beginning of 2010 with an estimated growth of 2.1%, the 
largest in the G7 (Vieria, 2009: FP5). Interestingly, in January of 2010, the IMF raised its 
estimation to 2.6% growth (CBC, 2010). Further, the Conference Board of Canada reported 
significant improvements in individual spending habits and increased government induced 
stimulus but was quick to warn that the trend would not last (Covant, 2010: D1).  The expected 
economic cooling did occur, as second quarter GDP slowed with “expansion of 2.5 per cent 
annualized from the booming 6.1 percent pace in the first three month of 2010” (Viera, 2010: 
B6). October saw worsening conditions in the United States and predictions for the Canadian 
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economy were lowered to 3.1 percent (Carmicheal, 2010: B4). This year would end with an 
annualized 3.3% increase in national GDP in the fourth quarter (Torobin and Grant, 2011).  
Saskatchewan, like Canada, experienced predictions of economic turbulence in 2010. As 
in the case of the nation, Saskatchewan started the year off with favorable GDP predictions 
from the Conference Board of Canada, RBC, and the CIBC, ranging from an increase of 2.5 
percent to 3.9 percent (Kyle, 2010: B4; Johnstone, 2010: A1; Leaders Post, 2010a: D1). Indeed, 
the CIBC noted that Saskatchewan had “considerable potential… [and was] well positioned to 
take advantage of [the global economic recovery],” noting expected increases from 
commodities and natural resources (Johnstone, 2010: A1). Saskatchewan continued to garner 
increased GDP projections (some of which were the highest in Canada) from the institutions 
mentioned above and others, until July (Kyle, 2010: B4; Leader Post, 2010: D1; Johnstone, 2010: 
D1; Star Phoenix, 2010: C8). By this time, heavy rain had damaged the agricultural sector and 
threatened growth (Hall, 2010: C1). Fortunately, potash sales saw a large increase and managed 
to bolster Saskatchewan’s economy and help the province post a 4 percent growth in GDP for 
2010 (Chabun, 2010: A1; Enterprise Saskatchewan, 2012: 3). 
Despite the slow start that was expected for the beginning of 2011, Canada started off 
quite strong. Goldman Sachs had high hopes for Canada at the beginning of the year as they 
expected GDP to increase to 3.5 percent by the third quarter, with the Canadian dollar trading 
above U.S. parity and lower unemployment (Madhavi, 2011: B1). However, in the middle of 
2011, the IMF warned Canada to be ready to enact stimulus in the event of another global 
economic crisis stemming from Europe and the United States (The Canadian Press, 2011). These 
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fears were of concern for federal finance minister Jim Flaherty when he noted that Canada 
faced several risks from the international economic climate (Curry, 2011: A5). As the year 
progressed, Bank of Nova Scotia analysts expected the third quarter to experience economic 
contraction and warned that Canada could be the first developed country to slip back into 
recession (Shmuel, 2011: B1). Other banks noted other downgrades were expected but seemed 
confident that the country would not experience a double dip recession (Shmuel, 2011: B1).   
Saskatchewan stood in contrast to the national economic picture. Saskatchewan started 
2011 off with high GDP expectations: the province was expected to post a 3.7 percent growth 
average for 2011, higher than the 2.4 national average according to a statement made by the 
Saskatchewan government (Johnstone, 2011: B1). BMO Capital Markets Economics estimated 
real GDP was expected to rise by 4.9 percent and set the economic pace for Canada as a whole 
(Leader Post, 2011: B1). Indeed, Scotiabank chief economist Warren Jetsin noted that 
Saskatchewan’s good fortune was tied to the demand for nearly all of the province’s 
commodities and that demand was high (Kyle, 2011:C5). Jetsin stated that Saskatchewan’s 
potential could make the province a large global player (Kyle, 2011:C5). As the year progressed, 
GDP growth estimates would range from 3.5 percent to as high as 4.9 percent (Leader Post, 
2011: B1; Star Phoenix, 2011: C8; Leader Post, 2011a: D1; Leader Post, 2011b: D1). As the 
election grew closer, RBC increase its projections in September to 4.3 percent due to solid 
commodity prices and better weather which helped agriculture (Couture, 2011: A1). These 
projections were backed again by the belief that Saskatchewan was set to lead the Canadian 
economy in 2012 (Couture, 2011: A1). BMO in October gave the Province an expected growth 
rate for 2012 of 2.9 percent, which was the highest of all provinces (Morrissy, 2011: C3). This 
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year also saw robust expected growth for Saskatchewan cities: the Conference Board of 
Canada’s Metropolitan report forecast that Regina and Saskatoon would post some of the 
largest economic growth for 2011 at 3.1 percent and 4.1 percent respectively (Tonequzzi, 2011: 
D3).  
Why might Saskatchewan’s GDP growth be expected to carry significant weight in 
structuring public perceptions of the economy? The answer, arguably, lies in the contrast 
between provincial and national economic fortunes. A look at Saskatchewan’s GDP growth, 
indicated on figure 3.1 (Canada West Foundation, 2010), shows a slow and steady pattern of 
growth since 1981. Interestingly, 2008 posted the highest growth the province had seen in 
some time, only to watch it drop during the recession. While there has been growth over the 
years, there have been few major increases in GDP growth; namely the mid-1990s and mid to 
late 2000s. This information is important to consider as, since 1981, Saskatchewan has only 
experienced two large instances of growth, and thus Saskatchewan residents would have 
noticed the significant drop in 2009.   
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At the same time, and as the information above indicates, Canada had a strong start in 
2010 and managed to see a small amount of growth. The following year was more tumultuous 
with similar expected gains in GDP, however, 2011 also had experts expressing fear about a slip 
back into recession and advocating increased stimulus. Conversely, Saskatchewan saw 
increasing GDP expectations that were tied to natural resources. Indeed, Saskatchewan was 
cast in a positive light, with many financial institutions noting the province was expecting to 
lead the country and had the potential to become a global player with its natural resources. In 
this regard, the perceptions of Saskatchewan, from the media, were quite strong when 
considering GDP. 
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3.2.2: Employment and Unemployment 
Levels of employment and unemployment are key economic measures. Unemployment 
is measured by the number of people who are unemployed but looking for work; employment 
is measured by the amount of people 15 years of age or over and are employed. Both of these 
measures are commonly discussed in the media and Statistics Canada as a measure of 
economic wellbeing. 
The unemployment rate in Canada hovered around the 8 percent mark in the beginning 
of 2010 and made a slow decline as the year progressed. Indeed, the year would end with 
unemployment at 7.6 percent; compared to other G7 countries, this was low (Macdonald, 
2010: A 27). The employment rate for 2010 began at 8.2 percent and remained close to that 
number till the fourth quarter, which saw a drop to 7.6 percent (Statistics Canada Canadian 
Labor Force Survey, 2012). 
 Saskatchewan in 2010 saw unemployment rates substantially lower than the national 
average. This was due to a 1.5 percent employment increase, compared to other provinces that 
were losing jobs; this led Saskatchewan to have the “the countries lowest jobless growth [the 
previous] year” (Johnstone, 2010: A1). As the year progressed, Saskatchewan continued to have 
low unemployment (Leader Post, 2010: B8; Wood, 2010:B1). By November, the unemployment 
rate would be 5.5 percent (Scott, 2010:  B1). Indeed, Saskatchewan would post the lowest 
unemployment numbers in the nation until November (Scott, 2010:  B1). Interestingly, 
Saskatchewan’s employed work force increased only by 1.1 percent (Johnstone, 2011: D1).  This 
number is misleading according to Sask Trends Monitor, however, as the apparent low 
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employment increase was due to the high increase in jobs from 2009 in Saskatchewan, which 
other provinces did not have (Johnstone, 2011: D1).  Simply put, other provinces were catching 
up to Saskatchewan and, comparatively, Saskatchewan’s job growth only appeared small. Other 
employment news of that year indicated that Saskatchewan also saw increases in wages, 
though the province was still below the national average (Star Phoenix, 2011: C12; Scott, 2010: 
C9). As well, there was a decrease in unemployment insurance claims, although pundits noted 
this may have been due to these benefits lapsing (Star Phoenix, 2010: C8). The year ended with 
a decrease in people receiving unemployment benefits compared to the previous year even 
with a small seasonally adjusted increase was reported (Scott, 2011: D1). 
 In 2011, Canada began with an unemployment rate of 7.7 percent (Statistics Canada 
Canadian Labor Force Survey, 2012). This would steadily decrease to its lowest point of 7.2 
percent, only to rise to 7.5percent by December. In March, there was an expected gain of 
30,000 jobs, however employment saw a net loss of 1,500 jobs (Blackwell and Torobin, 2011: 
B4). Employment rates began at 7.7 percent and dipped to a low of 7.3 percent as the year 
progressed (Statistics Canada Canadian Labor Force Survey, 2012). By November there was a 
small increase to 7.5 percent (Statistics Canada Canadian Labor Force Survey, 2012). 
Saskatchewan started the year off with positive unemployment numbers, posting a 5.4 
percent unemployment rate (Scott, 2011: C6). This number dropped to 5.0 percent in April, 
even though employment numbers dropped by 1,700 jobs compared 12 months previous 
(Scott, 2011: B1). Saskatoon and Regina had the lowest unemployment rate in the country with 
a 2,400 job increase from a year before (Leader Post, 2011: A1). These numbers were reflected 
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in the provincial average in August as Saskatchewan led the nation in the lowest unemployment 
rate at 4.9 percent, well below the national average of 7.2 percent (Yates, 2011: B1). September 
saw a new employment record for Saskatchewan at 0.9 percent or 4,900 jobs since September 
2011 (Goudy, 2011: B1). (Elliot noted that this was not a good indicator as these increases were 
expected due to the economy growing, noting that in his opinion employment has been “pretty 
much level” (Goudy, 2011: B1). By the beginning of November, the unemployment level was at 
3.7 percent, 0.3 lower than in September (Chabun, 2011: B1). Interestingly, at mid October 
there was a decrease of 1,100 full and part time jobs from September but there were 6,200 
more than in October of 2010 (Chabun, 2011: B1). Additionally, employment benefits declined 
throughout 2011, marking the third best in Canada (Leader Post, 2011c: D1), and there was a 
decrease in employment benefit claimants (Leader Post, 2011c: D1). However, wages were 
shown to not improve during 2011. Saskatchewan had the “lowest year over year earnings 
growth among provinces” and the second highest job growth at the same time (Johnstone, 
2011: D1). 
As can be understood by the information above, and as is demonstrated in Figures 3.2 
and 3.3, Saskatchewan was well under the national average of unemployment; at times it even 
had the lowest unemployment in the country. Though the charts for Saskatchewan do indicate 
a great deal of fluctuation, unemployment was in no danger of going above the national 
average. As such, Saskatchewan was doing incredibly well in this economic measure.  
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(Statistics Canada Canadian Labor Force Survey, 2012; Saskatchewan Bureau of Statistics, 
2011a). 
 
(Statistics Canada Canadian Labor Force Survey, 2012; Saskatchewan Bureau of Statistics, 
2011b). 
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3.2.3: Inflation 
 Canadian inflation increased in both 2010 and 2011.  Although initial reports in 
December 2010 noted that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose by 2.4 percent from the 
previous December (Vancouver Sun, 2011: A12), in 2011 Statistics Canada noted that there was 
only a 1.8 annual percent increase (Statistics Canada CPI historical summery, 2012 ) In 2011, 
Canada saw a 2.9 percent increase in inflation compared to 2010; this was the largest 
percentage change in nearly 20 years (Statistics Canada CPI historical summery, 2012). 
Compared to other Western provinces, Saskatchewan’s inflation rate was relatively high 
holding at 1.0 percent for 2010 (Elliot, 2010: 1). By the end of 2010, Saskatchewan’s inflation 
rate settled near the national average at 2 percent as reported by the media (Isfeld, 2010: C6). 
Inflation remained relatively high in Saskatchewan at the beginning of 2011 at a reported 2.2 
percent (Leader Post, 2011: C1). This was the fourth highest in Canada and the highest for 
Saskatchewan in two years; the increase was linked to rising energy costs, food and shelter 
(Leader Post, 2011: C1). By September the inflation rate sat at 3.4 percent (Leader Post, 2011a: 
B1).  
In terms of inflation, Saskatchewan did well in comparison to the national average in 
2010. In 2011, however, Saskatchewan saw relatively large increases in inflation but remain 
close to the national average. In this regard, Saskatchewan did not vary much in terms of the 
national average. Compared to GDP growth and unemployment figures, Saskatchewan did not 
excel as well in this measure of the economy but was able to stay just below the national 
average.  
 49 
 
3.2.4: Summary of Traditional Measures 
 The information on traditional economic measures places Saskatchewan in a very good 
position compared to Canada as a whole (see figure 3.4). Both GDP and unemployment were 
significantly better in Saskatchewan. Inflation, on the other hand, remained unchanged and 
close to the national average and would be the province’s only shortfall when looking at 
traditional economic measures. Another important boost for Saskatchewan came from the 
international financial community in 2011. At this time, the province’s credit rating of AA+ was 
changed from stable to positive (Saskatoon Sun, 2011: 15). Standard and Poor, who changed 
the rating, based its decision on strong liquidity, low and stable debt burden, economic 
performance through the recession, and moderate support from the federal government 
(Saskatoon Sun, 2011: 15). This rating was further increased when Standard and Poor bumped 
up Saskatchewan’s credit rating to AAA in recognition of its “low and declining debt burden” 
(Kiladze, 2011: B3). This boost in confidence, which was a result of many of the strong 
traditional economic measures mentioned above, gives a very positive economic picture of 
Saskatchewan during 2010 and 2011. Overall, when considering traditional economic measures, 
Saskatchewan appeared to have positive conditions, which would likely contribute to positive 
economic perceptions amongst the Saskatchewan public. 
3.3: Non-Traditional Economic Indicators 
The economic measures mentioned in the previous section are generally considered 
more traditional indicators of the economy. Those measures are discussed often in the media 
and have been important markers for economic health. However, these measures do not fully 
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capture all facets of the economy. In order to understand the full impact of the economy, this 
thesis will consider other indicators that might not be considered in other economic voting 
analyses but still may have an effect on economic perceptions.  
These non-traditional measures include food bank usage, affordable housing, and 
poverty. While the measures presented may not fully capture all non-traditional measures, as 
will be indicated in the next section they were discussed by the political parties during the 
election campaign. As such, these non-traditional measures will help provide a deeper 
contextual understand of the economy in Saskatchewan. It should be noted that unlike the 
previous section, this section will not compare Saskatchewan with Canada for most measures. 
Much of the available data focused solely on Saskatchewan with little national comparison. As 
such, an in-depth comparison with the nation is beyond the scope of this thesis.4 
3.3.1: Food Bank Usage and Poverty 
Food bank usage occurs in most major centers. These non-profit organizations provide 
food to residents who simply cannot afford meals on their own. Arguably, if their financial 
situation was more secure, individuals would not need these facilities. As such, it is reasonable 
to assume that the amount of food bank usage gives us an understanding of certain economic 
conditions that are at play in Saskatchewan’s two largest cities.  
At the start of 2010 Regina noted “unprecedented” food bank use with 10,000 people 
using the Regina Food Bank in January; 2,000 of those individuals were new users (Brownlee, 
2010: A7). Steve Compton, the director of operations for the Regina Food Bank, noted that 
                                                          
4 For a full chart of these non-traditional measure, please see Appendix B. 
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many people who use their facilities are working but making minimum wage and/or single 
parents (Brownlee, 2010: A7). By March, the province saw food bank usage grow by 20 percent 
compared to March 2009; Regina alone saw a 30 percent increase in the same time period 
(Leader Post, 2010: B7). These trends persisted throughout 2010, wherein 22,600 individuals 
used the food banks by March, which was a 20 percent increase from March 2009 (Switzer and 
Hall, 2010: A4). In Saskatoon, individual use rose 25.15 percent from the previous September 
and the number of serviced homes grew by 27.66 percent (Switzer and Hall, 2010: A4). These 
numbers led Saskatchewan to have one of the largest surges in food bank usage in the country 
(Switzer and Hall, 2010: A4). However, By 2011, Hunger Count 2011, a report released by Food 
Banks Canada, noted a nearly 9 percent decrease in Food Bank usage in the province (Pegg and 
Marshall, 2011: 22).  
In conjunction with food bank use, poverty in Saskatchewan also increased. In late 2010, 
Poverty Free Saskatchewan released a report that indicated that an estimated 140,000 people 
were affected by poverty and noted that Saskatchewan, unlike other places, did not have an 
anti-poverty action plan (Hall, 2010: A3). Along with this, in July 2010 the Conference Board of 
Canada’s Centre for the North named Northern Saskatchewan the second of the five poorest 
regions in Canada; the regional median income for that area is $13,600 annually (Kyle, 2010: 
A8). A year later, the Saskatchewan NDP presented statistics from the University of Regina’s 
Social Policy  Research Unity that noted that there were 113,000 Saskatchewan residents 
suffering from poverty, 33,000 of whom were children (Mandryk, 2011: A4).     
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3.3.2: Affordable Housing 
Affordable housing is also a good indicator of economic performance. Although housing 
projects in Saskatchewan grew by 25 percent from 2009 (Johnstone, 2010: C5), in 2010 
affordable housing availability in Saskatchewan was extremely low, making it difficult for new 
arrivals to the province to find homes; businesses were having the same issue with commercial 
space (Leader Post, 2010: B8). This was likely due to the competitive nature of the market (Star 
Phoenix, 2010a: C8). In January the Frontier Centre rated Regina housing as “moderately 
unaffordable” and Saskatoon housing as “seriously unaffordable” (Leader Post, 2010a: C1). 
Despite the competitive nature of the real estate market, affordable housing saw improvement 
in Saskatoon in June with the announcement of a 65 unit building designed for low income 
residents (Maclean, 2010: A 11). In 2011, the Government of Saskatchewan invested further in 
affordable housing with 34 million dollars for 100 communities and promised to invest 252 
million over 5 years in homes for people with “modest incomes” (Warren, 2011: A1; The 
Canadian Press, 2011).  This influx of housing would be welcome as in June as Saskatoon had 
the highest rate of homelessness in Canada according to a Salvation Army report, along with a 
vacancy rating of 1.9 percent in Saskatoon and 1.6 percent in Regina (Roth, 2010: B6). Diane 
Delaney, a coordinator with the Provincial Association of Transition Houses and Services of 
Saskatchewan, linked the low vacancy rate with the economic boom and its effect on housing 
and rental costs (Roth, 2010: B6).  However, the third and fourth quarter of 2010 saw 
affordability improve in Saskatchewan (Couture, 2011: D1). The third quarter was helped by a 
“softening in home prices and lower mortgage rates which lead to a significant improvement in 
affordability” (Leader Post, 2010b: D1), and the fourth quarter was helped by only small 
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increases in price and declining mortgage rates (Couture, 2011: D1). This improvement 
appeared to do little, however, as in the beginning of 2011 Saskatoon had the least affordable 
housing in Canada (Tembath, 2011: A6). This may have led to the Government of 
Saskatchewan’s decision to invest in affordable housing, as mentioned above. 
3.3.3: Summary of Non-Traditional Measures 
The non-traditional economic measures mentioned above paint a different picture of 
Saskatchewan’s economy compared to traditional measures. Food bank usage in the province 
was very high compared to past years as well as high compared to the national average 
(although there was a drop in 2011). Additionally, levels of poverty for the province were quite 
high, particularly in the north, and a large number of people in poverty were children. 
Affordable housing was the only non-traditional measure that increased investments and 
funding promises from the provincial government.  
3.4: Political-Economic Context 
 This section will consider two important political elements in describing Saskatchewan’s 
economic context: public attitudes, including perceptions of both parties stressed particular 
parts of the economy before and during the election campaign. Arguably, this campaign 
rhetoric has the ability to influence economic perceptions of voters.  
3.4.1: Saskatchewan Economic and Leadership Public Opinion 
As mentioned above, compared to the national economic climate, the Saskatchewan 
economy was faring very well on objective economic measures.  This reality was accompanied 
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by positive economic attitudes amongst the public.5 While provincial economic evaluation data 
are limited, at the start of 2010, 77 percent of Saskatchewan residents believed that the state 
of the Canadian economy was “good” and 50% of residents were positive that the national 
economy was going to improve in the following three months; this was significantly higher than 
the national average (Leaders Post, 2010c: D1). Job anxiety was also low at the beginning of 
2010, with Saskatchewan and Manitoba residents reporting the lowest job anxiety in Canada 
(Leaders Post, 2010c: D1). By March, only 13% of the Saskatchewan population had anxiety 
about their jobs (Regina Sun, 2010: 26). By the end of 2010 polling data indicated that 
Saskatchewan residents were very confident in the provincial economy. A Sigma Analytics 
survey found that Saskatchewan residents were 10 times more likely to believe the provincial 
economy was positive; 66 percent found it strong to very strong (Hall, 2010: A1).  Additionally, 
55 percent of people felt their personal financial situation was strong to very strong (Hall, 2010: 
A1).   
Saskatchewan residents started 2011 off with positive economic attitudes. RBC noted 
that nearly 50 percent of Manitoba and Saskatchewan residents were fairly optimistic about 
the Canadian economy (Leader Post, 2011d: D1), though this was a marketable drop from 2010. 
From April onward Saskatchewan residents continued to show strong belief in the economy 
with one report indicating that 82 percent felt the national economy was doing good (Kyle, 
2011: C8).  By April, the RBC Consumer Outlook Report found that 75 percent of Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba residents polled were optimistic about the national economy (Leader Post, 
2011b: B1; 41 Kyle, 2011: C8). Additionally, job anxiety was again quite low for Saskatchewan 
                                                          
5 For a full chart of Saskatchewan economic public opinion, please see Appendix C. 
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fluctuating between 15 and 11 percent (Leader post, 2011d: D1, Leader Post, 2011: C11). 
Interestingly, Saskatchewan resident’s optimism about their financial situation had dropped to 
40 percent, compared to the previous January (Leader post, 2011d: D1).  This drop in positive 
egocentric perceptions remained through the year, however Saskatchewan’s percentage was 
higher than the national average (Kyle, 2011: C8). This year also saw a third of Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba residents express concern about inflation in fuel and food costs (Leader Post, 
2011a: B1).  
Although Saskatchewan had particular issues in areas such as affordable housing, 
poverty and food bank usage during the 2010-11 period, these issues did not seem to 
undermine Saskatchewan resident’s positive perceptions of the economy through 2010 and 
2011. Indeed, attitudes towards job anxiety and faith in the economy were very high. The only 
issue of public concern appeared to be inflation, and when considering actual inflation rates, 
those concerns appear to be justified.  
Leadership evaluation has also proven to be an important consideration in vote choice. 
In 2011 the year began with strong public assessments of Brad Wall. In March an Angus Reid 
Poll identified Brad Wall as the most popular premier in Canada with a 63 percent approval 
rating (Leader Post, 2011: A1). According to Angus Reid, this came on the heels of high approval 
ratings throughout the past year (Leader Post, 2011a: A1). Political commentator Murray 
Mandryk noted in September that, going into the 2011 election, Brad Wall was significantly 
more popular than Dwain Lingenfelter; a trend that had been evident for the previous two 
years (Mandryk, 2011: A6). Mandryk reported the results of a poll indicating that 83 percent of 
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people felt Brad Wall would make a better premier than Lingenfelter (Mandryk, 2011: A9). 
Mandryk also noted that the growing two year discontent with Lingenfelter was making it 
difficult for people to vote for the NDP on the whole (Mandryk, 2011: A9). He argued that the 
low opinion of Lingenfelter was the New Democratic Party’s biggest problem in the impending 
election (Mandryk, 2011: A9).  
Overall, the Saskatchewan people showed strong positive assessments for 2010 and 
2011 provincial economy. Indeed a large number felt that the national economy was good or 
was going to get better. Additionally, there was little job anxiety. The only negative opinion was 
inflation in 2011, which also corresponded to one of the largest rises of inflation the province or 
the country had seen in some time. Further, the opinion of Brad Wall is very telling when 
compared to Dwain Lingenfelter.  
3.4.2: The Economy and the Election Campaign 
 Chapter 2 noted that campaign and issue effects can affect vote choice. Additionally, 
past economic voting studies have quantified various campaign and political effects into their 
work. Given this, the Saskatchewan Party and the New Democratic Party campaigns will be 
presented with sole focus on how they discussed and framed economic issues. 
As presented in the beginning of the chapter, unemployment was low and GDP projections 
were high and the Saskatchewan Party government was quick to tout the province’s economic 
success (Wall, 2011a; Global News, 2011). The economy also played a large part in the 
Saskatchewan Party’s victorious 2011 election campaign, with Premier Brad Wall making 
numerous mentions of “keeping Saskatchewan moving forward” economically (Wall, 2011b). 
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Wall further stated that he wants Saskatchewan to “continue to be a “have” province…and an 
economic leader in Canada and providing leadership in the world” (Wall, 2011b).  This was 
expressed in the Saskatchewan Party’s “Saskatchewan Advantage Growth Plan” in their 
platform, which noted several polices including: 
- “Keeping Taxes Low and resource royalties stable. 
- Reducing red tape and barriers to growth. 
- Promoting trade in key export markets. 
- Investing 2.2 billion in highway and transportation infrastructure. 
- Upgrading Crown Utility infrastructure. 
- Securing Saskatchewan’s natural resource advantage. 
- Attracting investment and telling Saskatchewan’s story to the world.” (The 
Saskatchewan Party, 2011). 
Further, under the heading ‘The Saskatchewan Party Record: A Strong Economy, a Growing 
Province’, the platform discussed economic proposals the party had implemented like lowering 
business taxes as well as the government’s record on balanced budgets and Standard and 
Poor’s credit rating increase (The Saskatchewan Party, 2011: 8). 
The Saskatchewan NDP also noted the economy in its platform (Saskatchewan New 
Democrats, 2011), but, arguably, not to the same extent as its rivals.  The New Democratic 
Party platform noted a variety of economic policies but not a concisely defined plan like the 
Saskatchewan Party. These policies included: 
- “Helping small business thrive and grow by eliminating the small business tax in the first 
term of an NDP government. 
- Creating a Northern Economic Strategy to expand opportunities in tourism, forestry, 
mining, aquaculture and processing. 
- Changing and simplifying the tax and royalty structure for potash to make sure that 
Saskatchewan’s residents are getting their fair share.  
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- Immediately setting a fair minimum wage to bring it over the poverty line and ten 
indexing it annually to the cost of inflation.  
- Offering programs to make life more affordable, including rent control and affordable 
housing.”  
- Resource sharing with First Nations (Saskatchewan New Democrats, 2011: 1, 9, 10). 
Overall, the Saskatchewan Party devoted more information and direct policies over the 
economy than did the New Democratic Party. Indeed, its “Growth and Opportunity” section 
was a large part of its platform. Additionally, the Saskatchewan Party used its platform to 
inform the various economic changes and its record on economic issues. The NDP, on the other 
hand, was more concerned with the economic issues that were directly affecting society like 
poverty and food bank usage. While the New Democratic Party was not afforded the 
opportunity of discussing its economic record, the majority of its platform seemed to revolve 
around families, community, health care, and improving these areas (Saskatchewan New 
Democrats, 2011). In this regard, there were stark differences in how both parties chose to 
highlight and discuss their respective areas of the economy. 
The election campaign advertisements noted the economy a great deal. The 
Saskatchewan Party’s commercial “Today in Saskatchewan” noted the economy was the best in 
Canada, unemployment was low, the budget was balanced, taxes reduced and infrastructure 
investment was increasing (Saskatchewan Party, 2011a). In “Today in Saskatchewan 2,” the 
advert again noted that the economy was growing and the population was growing and staying 
(Saskatchewan Party, 2011b). Leadership was also shown to be an important factor for the 
Saskatchewan Party as their “Leadership” ad expressed that leadership was important to 
maintain the economy and standing up for resources and managing them (Saskatchewan Party 
2011c). Indeed, the Saskatchewan Party also discussed leadership before the election by 
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running attack ads that questioned Dwain Lingenfelter as a leader (The Saskatchewan Party, 
2011d; The Saskatchewan Party, 2011e; The Saskatchewan Party, 2011f). It appears that the 
Saskatchewan Party was taking the economy and leadership into the campaign by making these 
two issues an important focal point to its campaign.  
 The NDP, on the other hand, chose to discuss the economy but through a different 
perspective lens. Its campaign ads tried to sway viewers to focus on other issues like housing, 
health care, education, highways, safety and the environment (Saskatchewan New Democrats, 
2011a). The economy was discussed in its “A Healthy Boom,” “Fair is Fair,” and “Rent Control”  
advertisements but only to the extent that the NDP felt that the boom was not properly being 
used to support health care or average families, as well as wages not keeping up to cost of 
living (Saskatchewan New Democrats 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). Indeed, the only economic policy it 
discussed in its commercials involved increasing potash royalties, the Bright Futures fund, which 
would come from resource royalties, and policies for housing (Saskatchewan New Democrats, 
2011c, 2011d, 2011e). While these policies have economic implications, arguably they do not 
engage the economy head on in the same way as the Saskatchewan Party’s proposed policies.  
 When comparing the campaign television advertisements between the parties there are 
stark differences. The Saskatchewan Party was concerned with capitalizing on the perceived 
economic good fortune of the province and attributing it to the government’s management as 
well as Brad Wall’s leadership. Conversely, the New Democratic Party’s approach on the 
economy was discussing the various issues that were perceived as ignored by the economic 
boom. Additionally, it did not discuss leadership at all, save for one advertisement in which 
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Lingenfelter suggested that leadership was a non-issue (Saskatchewan New Democrats, 2011a). 
With these differing attitudes on the economy and leadership, it is easy to understand where 
the priorities of the parties sat. The Saskatchewan Party presented itself as the party that was 
hoping to continue forward with the economy and management and maintain the positive 
benefits. Conversely, the New Democratic Party was interested in pointing out where the 
economic good fortune had failed certain aspects of the population. What is evident is the 
economy was at the crux of the majority of commercials during the campaign in one form or 
another. Interestingly, the issues discussed by both parties appear starkly divided between the 
traditional economic measures in the Saskatchewan Party commercials and non-traditional 
measures in the NDP commercials. 
3.5: Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to establish the economic context of Saskatchewan 
between January 2010 and November 2011. Once again, this chapter was not meant to 
definitively link the economic news articles and government documents presented above to the 
individual economic perceptions that will be described in the next chapter. Rather, the 
information above is meant to describe the economic situation in Saskatchewan during the lead 
up to the election and how the information presented an environment for positive economic 
perceptions. The previous sections used a variety of economic measures to determine this 
context. Presumably, this context can be linked to the economic perceptions of Saskatchewan 
residents due to the fact that these measures were discussed in the media and government 
documents.  
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 With this chapter validating Saskatchewan’s strong economic reality for 2010 and 2011, 
the focus of the thesis will turn to original data analysis using the 2011 Saskatchewan Election 
Study. The following chapter will measure the economic perceptions of Saskatchewan and how, 
if at all, these perceptions informed vote choice. 
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis 
4.1: Introduction 
Determining the reasons why people vote the way they do is not a simple task. As 
discussed in chapter 2, there are myriad interests, factors, issues and opinions that affect how 
people vote. Survey data allow researchers to measure and assess many of these factors. As 
past studies have done, this thesis utilizes individual level data and multivariate analysis to 
better understand some of the reasons why Saskatchewan voters voted for the Saskatchewan 
Party in 2011. Specifically, it seeks to understand how, if at all, Saskatchewan residents’ 
perceptions of the economy influenced their vote choices in the 2011 election. In doing so, one 
hypothesis will be tested: 
1. Positive economic perceptions will increase the odds of voting for the incumbent party 
in the 2011 Saskatchewan Election.  
In addition to testing the hypothesis, leadership evaluations will also be explored to see how, if 
at all, they influence the relationship between economic perceptions and vote choice. 
The data used for the analysis comes from the 2011 Saskatchewan Election Study 
(SKES). The SKES was compiled by the Survey and Group Analysis Laboratory, a part of the 
Social Science Research Laboratories at the University of Saskatchewan. This study was 
conducted over two weeks immediately following the 2011 Saskatchewan election (specifically, 
November 8 - 21, 2011) and collected 1,099 completed surveys of residents 18 years of age and 
older. The survey asked questions about a variety of attitudes and opinions regarding the 
election, and gathered basic socio-economic and demographic information. The University of 
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Saskatchewan Behavioral Research Ethics Board approved the SKES before its commencement. 
Since the SKES specifically asks about retrospective sociotropic and egocentric economic 
perceptions, as well as vote choice, it is apt for use in this study. The following sections will 
outline the dependent, independent and control variables that will be utilized in the logistic 
regression models.  
4.2: Variables 
 The dependent variable for this analysis is the respondent’s self-reported vote choice in 
the 2011 Saskatchewan Election. Specifically, this variable comes from the survey question: 
“Which Party did you vote for in the 2011 Saskatchewan Election?” As reported in Table 1, 43 
percent of respondents who answered that question said they voted for the Saskatchewan 
Party and 19.6 percent said they voted for the Saskatchewan New Democrats. The responses to 
this question were then recoded into the Saskatchewan Party dummy variable, which was 
coded as 1: Saskatchewan Party and 0: All other parties. The “don’t know” and “refused” 
categories were removed. It should be noted that most of the ‘other parties’ voters reported 
voting for the NDP; only 3.3 percent of survey respondents reported voting for a party other 
than the Saskatchewan Party or the NDP. Additionally, 1.2 percent responded with “don’t 
know” and 8.8 percent refused to respond. Only respondents who reported voting in the 
election were asked the vote choice question, and the analysis therefore excludes non-voters.  
The key independent variables are the economic perceptions of voters, specifically 
retrospective sociotropic and egocentric perceptions. The retrospective sociotropic variable 
comes from the survey question: “Over the past year has Saskatchewan’s economy gotten 
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better, gotten worse or stayed about the same?” The egocentric variable comes from the 
survey question: “Financially, are you better off, worse off or about the same as a year ago?” 
These measures are consistent with past studies looking at retrospective sociotropic and 
egocentric economic perceptions. As shown in Table 1, 55 percent believed the economy had 
improved in the last year (sociotropic economic perceptions), and 56 percent felt that their 
personal financial situation had remained the same (egocentric economic perceptions). From 
these frequencies it is easy to see that the majority feel that the economy is getting better; 
however the good economic times has not overly improved individual’s personal economic 
situation. Both economic perception variables were recoded to 1: Gotten Better, 0: stayed the 
same, -1: gotten worse. Coding the variables this way creates an ease of interpretation for the 
results.  
As leadership has been found to influence vote choice in past studies, leadership 
evaluations are a third independent variable that will be added into the model. Using data from 
the Saskatchewan Election Study, McGrane et al. (2012) found that the leadership evaluation of 
Brad Wall was a significant factor in vote choice. As such, the variable that measures Brad 
Wall’s leadership will be added. This variable employs a 100 point feeling thermometer of Brad 
Wall’s leadership, with 0 indicating the respondent “really disliked” him and 100 indicating they 
“really liked” him. The “don’t know” and “refused” categories were removed for the purposes 
of analysis. As reported in Table 2, average (mean) leadership evaluation is 67.86.  
It should be noted that the variable for Brad Wall’s leadership evaluation is unique in 
this analysis as it will be considered as an independent variable in the main model and then as a 
dependent variable as the analysis evolves.  
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Socio-demographic controls include gender, education, age, religion, region and income, 
as is consistent with the literature. Region includes five categories: Saskatoon census 
metropolitan area (CMA), Regina CMA, Smaller Cities (CAs), Rural South and Rural North. 
Additionally, religion has been recoded into dummy variables for individual faiths or beliefs 
with 1 indicating the religion and 0 indication all other faiths, no religion, don’t know, and 
refused. These can be compared to the “no religion” dummy variable, which was coded as 1 = 
no religion and 0 = all other faiths, don’t know and refused.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Variable N Frequency in Modal Category Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Saskatchewan Party Vote 
Choice 
727 Voted for Saskatchewan Party: 
43.2% 
- - 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Variable N Frequency in Modal Category Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Has the economy Gotten 
better, worse, stayed the 
same? (Sociotropic) 
1059 Gotten Better: 55.1% - - 
Financially, are you better, 
worse off, about the same? 
(Egocentric) 
1084 About the Same: 56.8% - - 
Brad Wall Leadership 1031 - 
 
67.86 27.32 
 
Control Variables 
 
Variable N Frequency in Modal Category Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Age 1078 - 
 
1962.89 16.59795 
Income 883 20,000 – less than 30,000: 
7.3% 
- - 
Education 1093 Bachelor’s Degree: 23.9% - - 
Sex 1099 Female: 51.7% - - 
Religion 1099 Catholic: 26.1% - - 
Geographic Region 1099 Rural South: 36.7%   
*“Don’t Know” and “Refused” responses were included in this summary. 
4.3: Bivariate Analysis 
Before moving to multivariate analysis, it is useful to consider the bivariate relationships 
among the main variables. This will allow for a better understanding of the variables being used 
and what may be expected in the regression models that follow this section. 
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To what extent are the retrospective sociotropic and egocentric perceptions correlated? 
Table 2 shows a positive relationship is statistically significant, and of weak to moderate 
strength (Pearson’s R = .270, gamma =.443; see Table 2). This correlation is small enough to 
allow for the independent variables to be used together with a low risk of endogeneity.  
Table 2: Bivariate Analysis of Economic Perceptions 
 Egocentric Economic Perception  
Worse Off About the 
Same 
Better Off Total 
Sociotropic 
Perceptions 
Gotten Worse 
 
17.3% 
(26) 
3.1% 
(19) 
3.4% 
(10) 
5.3% 
(55) 
 About the 
Same 
44% 
(66) 
44.3% 
(268) 
20.5% 
(60) 
37.6% 
(394) 
Gotten Better 38.7% 
(58) 
52.6% 
(318) 
76% 
(222) 
57.1% 
(598) 
Total  100% 
(150) 
100% 
(605) 
100% 
(292) 
100% 
(104) 
Gamma: .443* Chi square: 109.495* 
P: .000* 
Bivariate analysis also suggests a weak to moderate relationship between economic 
perception and vote choice (Cramer’s V = 2.82 for sociotropic, .247 for ecocentric; see Table 3). 
Looking first at sociotropic perceptions, 77% of those who felt the Saskatchewan economy had 
‘gotten better’ in the past year voted for the Saskatchewan Party, compared to 51.3% of those 
who felt the economy stayed the same, and only 38.5% of felt the economy had gotten worse. 
In other words, as retrospective sociotropic evaluations improved the percentage of 
respondents who reported voting for the incumbent Saskatchewan Party increased. The same 
pattern is seen with egocentric perceptions: 80 percent of those who felt their personal 
economic circumstances had ‘gotten better’ voted for the Saskatchewan Party, compared to 
64.3% of those who felt their personal financial situation had stayed the same, and only 40% of 
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those who felt their personal financial situation had ‘gotten worse’. Consistent with economic 
voting theory, these bivariate results suggest that there is a relationship between economic 
perceptions and Saskatchewan residents’ vote choice.  
 
Table 3: Bivariate Analysis of Economic Perceptions and Vote Choice 
Saskatchewan 
Party Vote 
Sociotropic Egocentric 
Gotten 
Worse 
Stayed the 
Same 
Gotten 
Better 
Worse Off Stayed the 
Same 
Gotten 
Better 
Yes 38.5% 
(10)  
51.3% 
(135) 
77% 
(324) 
40.9% 
(38)  
64.3% 
(278)  
80% 
(160)  
No 61.5% 
(16) 
48.7% 
(128) 
23% 
(97) 
59.1% 
(55) 
35.7% 
(153) 
20% 
(40) 
 Cramer’s V:.282* Cramer’s V: .247* 
 Chi Square:-56.586* Chi-Square: 43.948* 
P: .000*  
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4.4: Multivariate Analysis 
Multivariate analysis allows us to consider if the apparent relationship between 
economic perceptions and vote choice holds when other variables relevant to vote choice are 
controlled. The following section presents two models that seek to understand the relationship 
between retrospective sociotropic and egocentric perceptions on individuals’ vote choices. The 
first model includes sociodemographic variables and economic perceptions as predictors of 
vote choice. The second model introduces the leadership evaluation variable to consider what 
impact, if any, leadership evaluations have on the relationship between economic perceptions 
and vote choice. Both models use logistic regression analysis, which is appropriate given the 
categorical nature of the dependent variable. 
4.4.1 Model 1: Socio-demographic and Economic Perception Variables 
Economic voting theory argues that good economic times should lead to incumbent 
government being re-elected. Specifically, individual-level research suggests that both 
sociotropic and egocentric perceptions are, at times, significant factors in vote choice. Further, 
research suggests that sociotropic evaluations have greater influence on vote choice than do 
egocentric evaluations. To test these relationships in the Saskatchewan 2011 election context, 
the first model examines the relationship between the two economic evaluation variables and 
vote choice after controlling for socio-demographic factors. 
The logistic regression analysis was conducted in two steps (Table 4).  In the first step, 
only the socio-demographic variables are included. The results indicate that those with higher 
income were more likely to vote for the Saskatchewan Party. Additionally region also had a 
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positive impact on the odds for voting for the Saskatchewan Party. Conversely, the likelihood of 
voting for the Saskatchewan Party decreases with education. Neither age nor sex was a 
statistically significant predictor of vote choice. Additionally, this model only found 8.4 percent 
of the explained variance, as indicated by the Nagelkerke R2. With such a low Nagelkerke R2 it is 
clear that many other factors that influence vote choice are not present in this model.  
Table 4: Multivariate Analysis of Economic Perceptions and Vote Choice 
P: *.000, ** .010, *** .050 
With the baseline statistics found in step one, step two can begin. Step two of the model 
adds in the egocentric and sociotropic retrospective economic perceptions; the variables of 
importance for this thesis. Before discussing the model, it is important to note that an 
individual’s perception of the economy is, most likely, a mixture of prospective, retrospective, 
  Step 1   Step 2  
Variable B S.E Exp(B) B S.E Exp(B) 
Sex -.226 .185 .798 -.046 .199 .955 
Income .094** .032 1.098 .063 .035 1.065 
Age -.005 .006 .955 -.010 .006 .990 
Education -.222* .051 .801 -.197* .054 .821 
Region .180*** .075 1.197 .166*** .079 1.180 
Catholic -.402 .942 .669 -.401 .990 .669 
Anglican -.144 1.044 .866 -.277 1.090 .758 
United Church of Canada -.234 .955 .792 -.365 1.005 .694 
Baptist .552 1.195 1.737 .024 1.237 1.024 
Lutheran -.950 .992 .387 -1.240 1.045 .289 
Other Protestant .044 .984 1.045 -.224 1.035 .799 
Other Religion -.374 .960 .688 -.510 1.009 .601 
Not Religious -.374 .960 .403 -.954 .987 .385 
Sociotropic Perceptions - - - .792* .171 2.208 
Egocentric Perceptions - - - .592* .170 1.808 
Constant 16.114 11.010 93487.875 21.641 12.626 2.504E9 
 Nagelkerke  R2: .121       Nagelkerke  R
2
: 216 
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sociotropic and egocentric perceptions. With such an intermingling of perceptions, endogeneity 
between the two perceptions included in the model may exist. However, as noted earlier, the 
correlation between the two variables is rather modest (Pearson’s R=.270). Thus, while there is 
a correlation, it is low enough for the two variables to be included in the model. 
Table 4 demonstrates that the economic perception variables change the model quite a 
bit. Firstly, both retrospective sociotropic and egocentric perceptions are significant at the .000 
level, suggesting support for the hypothesis. Further, retrospective sociotropic economic 
perceptions are seen to have the largest effect in the model, increasing the odds of voting for 
the Saskatchewan Party by 22.1%, while egocentric economic perceptions increase in the odds 
of voting for the Saskatchewan Party by 18.1%. We also see a small change in our socio-
demographic variables; with the addition of the economic perceptions, education and region 
are also significant predictors of vote choice. Finally, the Nagelkerke R2 saw a significant 
increase of the explained variance in this step, moving from 8.4 percent to 21.6 percent. It is 
evident that, with this model, both sociotropic and egocentric economic perceptions seem to 
play a part in vote choice for the Saskatchewan Party. 
4.4.2 Model 2: Socio-demographic, Economic Perception and Leadership Evaluation Variables 
Past studies of economic voting have not fully considered the issue of leadership. As 
chapter 2 noted, political parties are often “defined by their leaders” (Parella, 2010: 240). As 
such, leadership can be an important consideration in vote choice. As Nadeau and Blais noted, 
“economic conditions do matter, but they matter in conjunction with Canadians’ judgments 
about the personal qualities and defects of party leaders” (Nadeau and Blais, 1995: 216). While 
the importance of leadership may ebb and flow over particular elections, analysis of the 2011 
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Saskatchewan election demonstrates that leadership is linked to vote choice. McGrane et al., 
using the Saskatchewan Election Study data, found that Saskatchewan residents’ opinions of 
Premier Brad Wall was a large predictor of vote choice in the 2011 election (2012: 24). With this 
factor being recognized, Brad Wall’s leadership variable is added into the model.  
Table 5: Multivariate Analysis of Economic Perceptions and Vote Choice (Expanded Model) 
Variable B S.E. Exp(B) 
Sex -.205 .289 .815 
Income .068 .051 1.070 
Age .018 .009 1.018 
Education -.249** .077 .779 
Region .189 .118 1.208 
Catholic -1.413 1.466 .243 
Anglican -.947 1.609 .388 
United Church of Canada -1.752 1.479 .173 
Baptist -.911 1.848 .402 
Lutheran -2.141 1.540 .117 
Other Protestant -2.191 1.505 .112 
Other Religion -2.208 1.495 .110 
Not Religious -1.977 1.461 .139 
Sociotropic Perceptions .420 .244 1.522 
Egocentric Perceptions .311 2.43 1.365 
Wall Opinion .104* .010 1.109 
Constant -38.178 18.585 .000 
Nagelkerke R
2
: .674  
P: *.000, ** .010, *** .050 
Table 5 shows that the addition of the leadership variable has a significant impact on 
our model. The retrospective sociotropic and egocentric variables become statistically 
insignificant.  Indeed, only two variables achieve statistical significance: income and leadership 
evaluations. The leadership variable is shown to have a large impact on vote choice: with a 
one unit increase in the opinion of Brad Wall’s leadership, the odds of for voting the 
Saskatchewan Party increase by 11%. The biggest indication of the effect of leadership 
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evaluations comes from the Nagelkerke R2, which sees a large increase from 19.1 percent of 
the explained variance to 67.4 percent. What we see clearly is that Saskatchewan residents’ 
favorable opinions of Brad Wall seemingly outweigh their opinion of their retrospective 
sociotropic and egocentric perceptions.  
These results raise a new question: are Brad Wall’s favorable leadership evaluations 
related to voters’ economic perceptions? It is to that question the next section will now turn. 
4.5: Leadership Evaluations and Economic Perceptions 
 The SKES data allows for the use OLS regression analysis to see if the retrospective 
sociotropic and egocentric perceptions that were used to understand vote choice may simply 
be a factor in Brad Wall’s leadership evaluation. Before engaging in the OLS model, a look at a 
bivariate analysis is important to better understand the data that will be employed in the 
model. As Table 6 demonstrates, residents with favorable economic perceptions also had 
favorable opinions of Brad Wall. For sociotropic economic perceptions the model category is 
“gotten better”; individuals in this category had a mean opinion score for Brad Wall of 75. The 
model category for egocentric perceptions was “stayed the same”; individuals in this category 
had a mean opinion score of 68 for Brad Wall. This chart shows that positive sociotropic 
perceptions are linked to high evaluations of Brad Wall. Additionally, neutral egocentric 
perceptions were linked with moderately high perceptions of Brad Wall.  
Table 6: Comparison of Means 
Brad Wall 
Leadership 
Sociotropic Egocentric 
Gotten 
Worse 
Stayed the 
Same 
Gotten 
Better 
Gotten 
Worse 
Stayed the 
Same 
Gotten 
Better 
Mean Score 45.98 60.68 75.04 56.44 67.78 74.19 
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N N=51 N= 373 N=573 N= 150 N= 583 N=285 
 
 The OLS regression model allows us to consider the relationship between economic 
evaluations and leadership evaluations while controlling for other factors.  OLS regression is 
appropriate due to the interval level nature of the dependent variable (leadership evaluations). 
The first model includes only socio-demographic variables; this stepwise approach will allow 
us to set a baseline for comparison once we add in our economic perceptions.  As indicated in 
Table 7, age and education are negatively related and income is positively related to Brad 
Wall’s leadership evaluations; all three of these control variables are statistically significant. 
Additionally, region was also statistically significant and increases the evaluation of Brad Wall 
by 2.01 percentage points for every one point increase. Overall, this model explains 10.5 
percent of the variation in leadership evaluations.   
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Table 7: Multivariate Analysis of Economic Perceptions and Brad Wall Leadership Evaluation 
 Step 1 Step 2 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficents 
Standardized 
Coefficent 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficents 
Standardized 
Coefficent 
  
Variable B Std. Error Beta t B Std. Error Beta t 
Constant 676.235* 115.156 - 5.872 784.701* 114.220 - 6.870 
Sex -2.652 1.853 -
.048 
-
1.431 
.130 1.806 .002 .072 
Income 1.570* .309 .181 5.075 1.207* .308 .137 3.919 
Age  -.312* .059 -
.187 
-
5.285 
-.374* .058 -
.202 
-
6.393 
Education -1.715** .499 -
.122 
-
3.438 
-1.334* .484 -
.095 
-
2.756 
Region 2.011** .758 .091 2.652 1.771** .730 .080 2.424 
Catholic 3.961 7.944 .063 .499 7.105 8.409 .113 .845 
Anglican 3.294 9.094 .22 .362 4.938 9.408 .034 .525 
United 
Church of 
Canada 
7.018 8.120 .089 .864 7.970 8.556 .102 .931 
Baptist 11.666 10.277 .056 1.135 9.517 10.446 .047 .911 
Lutheran 3.161 8.598 .027 .368 4.361 8.988 .037 .485 
Other 
Protestant 
15.854 8.374 .156 1.893 16.472 8.781 .163 1.876 
Other 
Religion 
11.015 8.118 .137 1.357 11.086 8.572 .136 1.293 
Not 
Religious 
-.778 7.942 -
.013 
-.098 2.712 8.411 .044 .322 
Sociotropic 
Perceptions 
- - - - 11.491* 1.563 .246 7.354 
Egocentric 
Perceptions 
- - - - 5.327* 1.484 .125 3.589 
 Adjusted R
2
: 
.105 
   Adjusted R
2
: 
.197 
   
P: .000*, .010**, .050*** 
 
With our baseline established for comparison, the economic perceptions are added into 
the model. Table 7 demonstrates that economic perceptions did play a role in Saskatchewan 
residents’ assessments of Brad Wall’s leadership. Retrospective sociotropic perceptions have 
the largest impact as a one unit increase in those perceptions increases the opinion of Wall by 
11.5 percentage points. Egocentric perceptions have a smaller impact as a one unit increase in 
those perceptions increase the opinion of Wall by of 5.33 percentage points. Like the previous 
step, age, and education were negative and statistically significant were also negative, income 
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was also significant and positive. Region was significant as well and indicated that for every one 
percentage point increase opinion of Brad Wall increased by 1.77 percentage points.  Finally, 
this model explains 20 % of the explained variance. Compared with step 1 of the model, there is 
a 10 percentage point increase in the explained variance. While this adjusted R2 obviously 
indicates that there is still more to explain in understanding what factors are equated with Brad 
Wall’s leadership evaluations, it does tell us that economic perceptions are an integral part.   
An OLS regression analysis was also run using the leadership opinion of Dwain 
Lingenfelter, the opposition party leader, as the dependent variable to understand if economic 
perceptions were a significant part of his leadership opinion. Only the control variables sex, 
income, age, and education were found to be statistically significant. All other variables, 
including sociotropic and egocentric variables, were statistically insignificant. Since economic 
perceptions were not significant in Lingenfelter’s leadership opinion the tables and detailed 
analysis are not presented here. 
4.6: Analysis 
 The two sets of analyses give us a deeper understanding of vote choice in the 2011 
Saskatchewan election. The hypothesis guiding this thesis was that positive retrospective 
sociotropic and egocentric perceptions influenced vote choice during the 2011 Saskatchewan 
election. Considering the economic strength of the province in the year prior to the 2011 
Saskatchewan election, there was strong reason to expect that the good economic 
performance of the province contributed to the decisive victory of the Saskatchewan Party. As 
chapter 2 noted, the theory of economic voting backs this assertion in that governments are 
rewarded for good economic times. The analysis finds that while these perceptions were in 
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play, they did not have a direct impact on vote choice; instead, they had an impact on 
leadership evaluation. 
The first model initially revealed that retrospective sociotropic and egocentric 
perceptions of the economy played a role in vote choice. When considering the theory of 
economic voting and perceptions, Saskatchewan was consistent with many other studies in that 
both perceptions had a positive effect on vote choice, with sociotropic having the largest. 
However, once the effect of Brad Wall’s leadership was considered, those perceptions were 
overshadowed and became statistically insignificant. The hypothesis guiding this thesis was that 
economic perceptions had a direct effect on vote choice in the 2011 Saskatchewan election; the 
data, however, indicated that a direct impact on vote choice was not statistically significant. 
 While a direct impact on vote choice was not present, a direct relationship between 
economic perceptions and leadership was found. With any evaluation of a leadership role, 
many factors go into this kind of assessment. Public image, competence, stance on dividing 
issues like the economy, and many others factors entered into a leadership evaluation.  The 
data did not allow us to consider all of these factors, but it was possible to demonstrate that 
economic evaluations play a role in explaining Brad Wall’s strong leadership evaluations. 
Overall, the analysis showed that the economic perceptions did have a role to play in 
vote choice in the 2011 Saskatchewan election, albeit in an indirect fashion. Leadership was the 
top factor pertaining to vote choice, but the analysis shows that Saskatchewan residents linked 
their economic perceptions to their assessment of Wall. From this information, it is evident that 
Saskatchewan residents believed that their economic best interests lay with Brad Wall and his 
leadership. When one considers the Saskatchewan Party advertising, with its promotion of Brad 
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Wall and the Party’s economic vision for Saskatchewan, it is easy to understand how voters 
linked the Saskatchewan Advantage vision to the premier and subsequently took these 
perceptions into the voting booth. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate how, if at all, individual-level perceptions of 
economic conditions affected provincial vote choice decisions in the 2011 Saskatchewan 
election. Indeed, the economy is an issue that is ever changing and constant, in some form or 
another, in nearly every election. Though the issue of economic vitality ebbs and flows with 
importance in each election, it is an issue that is in constant play. With a very large body of 
literature devoted to the linkages between the economy and vote choice in national 
governments and sub-national governments, it is of interest to political scientists to map out 
these relationships to better understand how the electorate thinks.  
As seen in chapter 2, the vast amount of literature on economic voting has pushed this 
area of study into a variety of arenas. This thesis chose to look at perceptions of the economy. 
This was chosen as perceptions are what drives voters to make decisions using the economic 
information at hand. By using individual level data we can infer the attitudes and opinions of 
Saskatchewan residents rather than presuming a link between objective economic measures, 
such as GDP reports and inflation rates, like some studies involving economic voting have 
previously done. Saskatchewan residents’ perceptions of the economy by for the two years 
before the election appeared to be accurate. As chapter 3 discussed, Saskatchewan was seen at 
many times to be one of the few provinces with strong GDP predictions in Canada, and led the 
country with low unemployment; both factors are very important in economic recovery. 
Additionally, news reports and government platforms supported the fact that the 
Saskatchewan economy was an important issue during the two years leading to the election 
and during the subsequent campaign to deem it an important issue for Saskatchewan residents. 
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This thesis has demonstrated that Saskatchewan’s residents had good reason to be satisfied 
with the economy for the year prior to the 2011 Saskatchewan election. With this economic 
context in mind, it would appear that the theory of economic voting, in which governments 
who enjoy good economic times are rewarded with votes during elections, could have been a 
reason for the decisive electoral win for the Saskatchewan Party during the 2011 election. 
The analysis from chapter four suggested a significant link between economic 
perceptions and vote choice, albeit in an indirect fashion. Using the data collected by the 2011 
Saskatchewan Election Study, the first regression model created suggested that economic 
perceptions were linked to voting for the Saskatchewan Party in the 2011 election. Indeed, the 
hypotheses that were considered were initially supported: positive economic perceptions did 
have a positive outcome on the incumbent vote choice and sociotropic perceptions were found 
to have a (somewhat) stronger influence on vote choice than egocentric perceptions.  However, 
given that a previous study done using the same data that pointed to leadership evaluations as 
the highest determinant of vote choice during the 2011 election, the model was ran again while 
controlling for leadership. Once the variable of leadership was added to the model, all other 
variables, including economic perceptions, failed to reach significance.  
Given these findings, the second model tested the same economic perceptions and 
demographic variables as predictors of leadership evaluation to understand if they had an 
effect on Brad Wall’s leadership evaluation. Economic perceptions were shown to be 
statistically significant predictor’s of Brad Wall’s leadership evaluation. Simply put, 
Saskatchewan residents’ opinions of Brad Wall were tied to their economic perceptions. As 
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such, it appears that Saskatchewan residents felt that Brad Wall was the most suitable person 
to improve or maintain the economic situation in Saskatchewan.  
This thesis linked economic perceptions to leadership evaluations and it seems, in the 
2011 Saskatchewan election, these perceptions were shown to be a significant part of Brad 
Wall’s leadership opinion and assist the Saskatchewan Party, to a decisive victory in 2011.  
When considering the theory of economic voting, which argues that governments are rewarded 
for good economic times, it appears in this case again that the Saskatchewan Party government 
was rewarded, to a certain degree, for good economic times, and that the Saskatchewan Party 
benefited from Premier Wall’s popularity and his perceived economic competence. In this 
regard this theory appears to be in play, though again it is due to the added variable of 
leadership. Indeed, it seems that the Saskatchewan Party also owes a lot of its decisive win in 
the 2011 election to the popularity of Brad Wall. 
This thesis has laid the initial groundwork for further economic voting studies at the 
provincial level. While this study has looked at two different economic voting variables, 
retrospective sociotropic economic perceptions and retrospective egocentric perceptions, there 
is more work that needs to be done in this field. Due to the specific data collected in the 2011 
Saskatchewan Election Study, prospective sociotropic perceptions and prospective egocentric 
perceptions were not measured. Additionally, the relationships between vote choice, economic 
evaluations and leadership evaluations should be tracked over time to see if economic 
perceptions have a significant impact on all elections or if these relationships strictly occur 
during times of economic vitality. With Saskatchewan’s history of a boom and bust economy 
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tied to resources and agriculture, these relationships may show fluctuations and it is important 
to see if the same factors affect vote choice in future elections.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Traditional Economic Indicators 
 2010 2011 
Canada Saskatchewan Canada Saskatchewan 
GDP January: IMF 
estimates Canadian 
GDP growth of 2.6% 
(CBC, 2010). 
July: Bank of Canada 
forecasts 3% growth 
in the second 
quarter (Viera, 
2010: B6) 
April: The Canadian 
Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation 
projected a 2.5% 
rise in GDP in 2010 
(Moore, 2010: G10). 
June: BMO Capital 
Markets predict 
growth by 3.4% 
(Covert, 2010: B1). 
July: IMF raises their 
Canadian prediction 
to 3.6% for 2010 
(Calgary Herald, 
2010: E1). 
May- August: August 
brought news that 
the second quarter 
would see 2.5% 
growth which was 
an unexpected drop 
to 2.5% annualized 
expansion from the 
6.1% in the first 
quarter (Viera, 
2010: B6) 
 However, by 
October, they would 
lower this prediction 
to 3.1% due to 
economic conditions 
worsening in the 
United States 
(Carmichael, 2010: 
B4). 
January: RBC predicts a 
3.9% increase in GDP; 
CIBC predicts 3% 
(Leaders Post, 2010a: 
D1, Johnstone, 2010: 
A1). The Conference 
Board of Canada noted 
a more conservative 
2.5% growth (Kyle, 
2010: B4). 
March: CIBC and the 
Conference Board of 
Canada increases GDP 
growth projections to 
3.5% (Leader Post, 
2010: D1; Johnstone, 
2010: D1). RBC posted 
expected GDP growth 
of 3.9% (Regina Sun, 
2010: 26). 
June: Scotia Economics 
predicted GDP growth 
by 3.9%, the second 
highest growth among 
the Provinces, CIBC 
predicts 3.8% (Star 
Phoenix, 2010: C8, 
Leader Post, 2011a, 
D1). 
July: Stronger 
commodity prices 
increase the BMO 
projection to 4.2% 
(Covert, 2010: A 32).  
However, it would 
appear that this was 
overzealous as weather 
conditions affected 
agriculture and TD’s 
forecast would drop 
from 3.2% to 2.1% (Hall, 
2010: C1).  
September: The bad 
weather hurt 
January: Goldman 
Sachs predicts GDP 
to increase by 3.5% 
by the third quarter 
(Madhavi, 2011: B1). 
The Bank of Canada 
increased their 
forecasts by .1% to 
2.4% for 2011 
(Vieira, 2011: E3). 
Additionally, the IMF 
lowered their GDP 
growth expectations 
to 2.3%, down .4% 
(Vieira, 2011: FP 1). 
February: The 
federal government 
lowered their 
economic 
projections for 
Canada by .1% to 
2.4% (Routers, 2011: 
B1). 
February: Bank of 
Montreal Merrill 
Lynch and Royal 
Bank project 3% or 
better GDP Growth 
(Whitehorse Star, 
2011: 15). 
At this time, reports 
were positive about 
the fourth quarter of 
2010’s GDP increase 
of 3.3% which was 
above the projected 
3% (Madhavi 
Acharya, 2011: B3). 
This was expected to 
spur investment and 
additional economic 
opportunities 
(Madhavi Acharya, 
2011: B3). 
January: The 
Saskatchewan 
government notes 
that 8 major 
economic forecasters 
predict high GDP 
projections of 3.7% 
which was higher than 
the 2.4% national 
average (Johnstone, 
2011: B1). 
BMO Capital Market 
Economics estimated 
a 4% rise making it the 
largest provincial 
forecast (Leader Post, 
2011: D1). Both the 
Saskatchewan 
government, BMO 
and Scotiabank 
pointed 
tocommodities being 
in high demand 
(Johnstone, 2011: B1; 
Leader Post, 2011: D; 
Kyle, 2011:C5). 
March: RBC forecasts 
real GDP growth of 
4.9% (Leader Post, 
2011: B1). 
June: BMO estimates 
GDP growth of 3.9% 
(Star Phoenix, 2011: 
C8). RBC would revise 
their projections to 
3.8%, due to 
persistent moisture 
hindering agriculture 
(Leader Post, 2011a: 
D1). This reduction 
moved Saskatchewan 
to second place for 
best GDP growth 
behind Alberta 
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February, 2011: 
Statistics Canada 
reported that the 
fourth quarter of 
2010 saw an 
annualized 3.3% 
increase (Torobin 
and Grant, 2011). 
agriculture but an 
increase in potash 
demand appeared to 
make up for it with RBC 
noting a 6.3% increase 
for 2010 (Chabun, 
2010: A1). 
November: GDP growth 
predictions would 
lower to 3.3% by 
Scotiabank (Leader 
Post, 2010:C1).  As it 
stands, in 2012 
Statistics Canada 
indicated that, in 
November of 2010, 
Saskatchewan’s GDP 
had achieved a 4% 
increase compared to 
the previous November 
(Enterprise 
Saskatchewan, 2012: 3). 
March: Statistics 
Canada note a .5% 
growth in GDP for 
January and 
increased 
projections from 
BMP at 4% for the 
first quarter of 2011 
(Morrissy, 2011:C3). 
Second quarter 
contracts and GDP 
drops .4% (Shmuel, 
2011: B1).   
(Leader Post, 2011a: 
D1).  
July: Scotiabank 
projected a 3.5% 
increase in GDP, as 
they believed that 
export prices would 
still allow agriculture 
to increase GDP 
(Leader Post, 2011b: 
D1).  
September: RBC 
increased their 
predictions, due to 
good commodity 
prices and improved 
weather, to 4.3% 
(Couture, 2011: A1). 
October: BMO 
predicted growth for 
the province at 2.9%, 
the highest of all their 
provincial projections 
(Morrissy, 2011: C3). 
Employment The unemployment 
rate in Canada 
hovered around the 
8% mark in the 
beginning of the 
year and made a 
slow decline as the 
year progressed 
(Statistics Canada 
Canadian Labor 
Force Survey, 2012). 
2010 ended with 
unemployment at 
7.6%. Compared to 
other G7 countries 
this was low 
(Macdonald, 2010: A 
27). 
Please note, the 
Statistics on Chart 
3.1 were gathered 
after the year had 
finished. The 
information above 
comes from news 
articles during 2010. 
January: Saskatchewan 
sees a 1.5% increase in 
employment and held 
the lowest 
unemployment 
numbers in the country 
(Johnstone, 2010: A1). 
The Saskatchewan 
Bureau of Statistics 
indicated that the 
unemployment rate in 
January was 5.1 % (Sask 
Statistics, 2011: 1). 
April: Saskatchewan 
continues with the 
lowest unemployment 
numbers at 4.3% 
(Leader Post, 2010: B8). 
July: Again 
Saskatchewan had the 
lowest unemployment 
numbers in the nation, 
even though 
unemployment 
increased to 5.1% 
(Wood, 2010:B1). 
November: 
Saskatchewan falls into 
Canada saw 2011 
begin with an 
unemployment rate 
of 7.7% (Statistics 
Canada Canadian 
Labor Force Survey, 
2012). This would 
steadily decrease to 
its lowest point of 
7.2%, only to rise to 
7.5% by December. 
March: Employment 
sees a net loss of 
1500 jobs compared 
to the expected gain 
of 30,000 jobs 
(Blackwell and 
Torobin, 2011: B4). 
January: 
Saskatchewan posted 
an unemployment 
rate of 5.4% (Scott, 
2011: C6). 
April: Statistics 
Canada reports 
Saskatchewan has a 
5% unemployment 
rate (Scott, 2011: B1).   
May: Saskatoon and 
Regina leads the 
nation with the lowest 
unemployment rate in 
the country (Leader 
Post, 2011: A1). 
August: Statistics 
Canada reports 
another decrease in 
Saskatchewan’s 
unemployment rate 
to 4.9% (Yates, 2011: 
B1). 
September: 
Saskatchewan sets a 
provincial record with 
a .9%, or a 4,900 job 
increase in compared 
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second place for 
unemployment in the 
country at 5.5% (Scott, 
2010:  B1).   
December: 
Saskatchewan’s work 
force increased by only 
1.1% (Johnstone, 2011: 
D1).  It has been 
suggested that 
Saskatchewan 
experienced such 
strong growth in 2009 
that, comparatively, it 
appears that 
Saskatchewan had low 
job growth (Johnstone, 
2011: D1). Simply put, 
compared to other 
provinces, 
Saskatchewan was 
ahead in job growth 
and other provinces 
were catching up 
(Johnstone, 2011: D1).   
Additionally, December 
would see a 4.2% 
increase in wages, 
compared to December 
2009, (Star Phoenix, 
2011: C12). While this 
was good news, wages 
were still below the 
national average 
holding fourth place in 
provincial rankings (Star 
Phoenix, 2011: C12). 
to September 2010 
(Goudy, 2011: B1). 
November: 
Information just 
before the election 
indicated that 
Saskatchewan held a 
3.7% unemployment 
rate, a decrease of 
.3% since September 
(Chabun, 2011: B1). 
Inflation December 2010: 
Initial reports noted 
that the consumer 
price index rose by 
2.4 % from the 
previous December 
(Vancouver Sun, 
2011: A12). 
However, in 2011 
Statistics Canada  
noted that there 
was a 1.8 annual % 
change in the 
Consumer Price 
index from 2009 to 
July: Statistics Canada 
reports that the 
inflation rate had only 
increased by .4% 
compared to the 
previous July (Scott, 
2010: D1).   
Oct: Saskatchewan 
shows a consistent 1% 
inflation rate for the 
year (Elliot, 2010:1) 
December: The end of 
the year would see 
Saskatchewan’s 
inflation rate settle with 
In 2011, Canada 
would see a 2.9% 
increase in inflation 
compared to 2010; 
this was the largest 
percentage change 
in nearly 20 years 
(Statistics Canada 
CPI historical 
summery, 2012)  
January: Inflation 
increased to 2.2%, 
making it the fourth 
largest in Canada and 
the highest in 
Saskatchewan in the 
past two years 
(Leader Post, 2011: 
C1). 
April: The 
Government of 
Saskatchewan noted 
that inflation in April 
would drop to nearly 
2.5% (Saskatchewan 
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2010 (Statistics 
Canada CPI 
historical summery, 
2012) 
the national average of 
2% according to the 
media (Isfeld, 2010: 
C6). 
Bureau of Statistics. 
2011. 
13).  
May: Inflation rises to 
3.5% (Saskatchewan 
Bureau of Statistics. 
2011. 
13). 
June: Inflation would 
drop nearly 1% to 
2.6% (Isfeld, 2011: 
A26). 
July: There was a 
small rise of .2% to 
2.8% (Abma, 2011: 
D3). 
September: There was 
a large increase to 3.4 
percent from the 
previous year’s 
September and a .7% 
increase from August 
(Leader Post, 2011a: 
B1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87 
 
Appendix B 
Saskatchewan Non-Traditional Economic Indicators 
 2010 2011 
Food Bank Regina Food Bank notes 2,000 new users of the 
food bank in January bringing the total to 10,000 
people (Brownlee, 2010: A7). 
March: Saskatchewan food banks see a 20% surge 
compared to the previous March; Regina saw a 30 
% increase in that same time frame (Leader Post, 
2010: B7). Indeed within that 12 month span, 
22,600 individuals used a Saskatchewan Food 
Bank (Switzer and Hall, 2010: A4). 
November: Saskatoon saw individual Food Bank 
use rise by 25.15% from September 2009 and 
helped lead Saskatchewan to have one of the 
largest surges in Food Bank use in the country 
In 2011, Hunger Count 2011, a report 
released by Food Banks Canada, noted a 9 % 
decrease in Food Bank usage (Food Banks 
Canada, 2011: 22). 
Poverty 
 
July: The Northern Saskatchewan Region was 
named the second poorest region in Canada with 
a mean income of $13,600 annually (Kyle, 2010: 
A8).   
By late 2010, Poverty Free Saskatchewan 
estimated that 140,000 people were affected by 
poverty (Hall, 2010: A3). 
 
 
July: Murray Mandryk discussed poverty and 
the NDP’s plans to combat the 113,000 
individuals below the poverty line; 33,000 of 
which are children (Statistics provided by 
the Social Policy Research Unit at the 
University of Regina) (Mandryk, 2011: A4). 
Affordable 
Housing 
January: The Frontier Centre rated Regina’s 
housing as “moderately unaffordable” and 
Saskatoon as “seriously unaffordable” (Leader 
Post, 2010: C1).  
April: A Royal LePage survey noted that affordable 
housing was very competitive in Saskatoon with 
homes for sale receiving multiple offers compared 
to 2009 (Star Phoenix, 2010: C8). 
June: Affordable housing increased by a planned 
65 units in Saskatoon for low income individuals 
(Maclean, 2010: A 11). This boded well as a 
Salvation Army report that same month placed 
Saskatoon with the highest rate of homelessness 
in Canada (Roth, 2010: B6). The same report noted 
that Saskatoon posted a 1.9% increase, and Regina 
a 1.6% increase in homelessness (Roth, 2010: B6). 
RBC analysts found that Saskatchewan’s housing 
and rental costs started upwards in the second 
quarter of 2010  (Star Phoenix, 2010: C6). 
Interestingly, RBC found that housing in 
Saskatchewan was still below the national average 
and “not a major concern” (Star Phoenix, 2010: 
C6). 
The third and fourth quarters of 2010 appeared to 
see considerable improvements in affordability 
measures for housing. The third quarter was 
helped by a decline in RBC’s affordability 
January: Saskatchewan started 2011 with 
the least affordable housing in Canada 
(Tembath, 2011: A6). 
February: The Saskatchewan government 
announces planned investment of 34 million 
dollars for new affordable housing in 100 
communities (The Canadian Press, 2011).   
March: The Saskatchewan government 
furthered their commitment to housing by 
adding an additional 253 million, over five 
years, to increasing housing for individuals 
with “modest incomes” (Warren, 2011: A1). 
September: Yorkton received 2.4 million for 
22 one bedroom units with funds provided 
by the Canadian Economic Action Plan (Daily 
Commercial, 2011: 168). Additionally, Sask 
Trends Monitor noted that Saskatchewan 
was average when it came to issues of 
overall housing conditions and below the 
national average (Johnstone, 2011: D1).  
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measures (proportion of pre-tax income need to 
become a homeowner) (Leader Post, 2010: D1), 
and the fourth being helped by only small 
increases in price and declining mortgage rates 
(Couture, 2011: D1).  
 
 
 
Appendix C 
Saskatchewan Economic Public Opinion 
2010 2011 
January: RBC’s Canadian Consumer Outlook Report 
noted that Saskatchewan and Manitoba had the lowest 
job anxiety at 13% (Leaders Post, 2010: D1). 
Additionally, Saskatchewan residents believed the state 
of the economy was “good” at 77% and 50% of people 
polled felt that the national economy was going to get 
better; these percentages were significantly higher than 
the national average (Leaders Post, 2010c: D1). 
March: RBC’s Canadian Consumer Outlook Report found 
strong numbers again. Saskatchewan’s population 
showed only 13% of residents had job anxiety and 73% 
felt that the national economy was “good” (Regina Sun, 
2010: 26). As well, two thirds of Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba residents believed the national economy was 
going to get better within the year (Regina Sun, 2010: 
26).  
July: A new Consumer Outlook Report showed relatively 
unchanged numbers with 78% of Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba residents believing the national economy was 
doing well compared to the 60% national average (Scott, 
2010a: B1). 
December: By the end of the year, a survey done by 
Sigma Analytics found that Saskatchewan residents were 
10 times as likely to believe that the national economy 
was positive; 66% of respondents felt it was strong to 
very strong (Hall, 2010: A1).   Additionally, 55% of people 
felt their personal financial situation was strong to very 
strong (Hall, 2010: A1).   
January: 2011 started off with similar positive attitudes 
towards the national economy as the previous year. 
RBC Financial Group noted that Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan residents job anxiety was low at 15%, 
still the lowest in the country, and of these same 
residents 50% were optimistic about the national 
economy (Leader post, 2011d: D1). Interestingly, there 
was an 8% drop in their optimism about their 
individual financial situation to 40%; the drop was 
compared to the previous January (Leader post, 2011d: 
D1).  
April: 75% of Saskatchewan and Manitoba residents 
were optimistic about the national economy (Leader 
post, 2011b: B1).  This same report noted a small, 1%, 
increase in job anxiety as well as one third of 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba residents concerned 
about inflation in fuel and food costs (Leader post, 
2011b: B1).  
July: Increased optimism was seen in an updated RBC 
Consumer Outlook Report. 82% of Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba residents believed the national economy was 
“good”, and 41% believed their personal finances 
would improve; both numbers were significantly higher 
than the national average (Kyle, 2011: C8).  
October: The final RBC Consumer Outlook Report 
noted that job anxiety was still low at 11%, but 
Confidence in Canada’s economy dropped two second 
place, behind Alberta, at 39% (Leader Post, 2011: C11). 
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